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The Current Situation 
The production and marketing of slaughter cattle are of rapidly 
increasing importance to the Oklahoma economy. During 1969, marketings 
of fed cattle in Oklahoma totaled 496,000 head. This compares to 1960 
marketings totaling 143,000 head. 1 Commercial cattle slaughter in 
Oklahoma totaled 713,500 head in 1969 compared to 334,400 during the 
2 year 1960. Relative to other crops, "cattle and calves" ranked first 
in importance in 1968 with a value of production estimated at $375.7 
million.
3 
Increasingly, the beef cattle sector is rising to a position 
of dominant importance to the economy of the state. 
Most analysts agree cattle feeding and related slaughtering opera-
4 tions will continue to grow in Oklahoma. The western counties of 
Oklahoma, especially the three Panhandle countias, are part of the 
rapidly growing Southern Plains feeding area. The Southern Plains 
area fed eight percent of the nation's cattle in 1960 but this share 
had grown to 25 percent in 1969. Continued increases in growth are 




Growth typically requires change and reorganization. The beef 
cattle sector of the Oklahoma economy is no exception. As cattle feed-
ing and slaughtering activities expand, there is concurrent expansion 
in the marketing tasks to be performed. If marketing procedures emerge 
which are characterized by inefficiency, development of the beef cattle 
industry is slowed and the contribution this particular industry or 
sector can make to economic growth of the state as a whole is decreased. 
An efficient and effective beef marketing system is therefore important. 
Available research relating to problems of marketing in the beef 
industry is directed primarily toward activity at some one level. 
Pleas for research dealing with the interaction between the identifi-
able levels of the beef marketing system were voiced by Kohls in the 
6 7 
19SO's and echoed by Shaffer as recently as 1968. However, little 
has been done; there is a void in the received literature concerning 
the implications of various types of interaction, or alternative forms 
of coordination, between the levels of the system. 
Activity at the various levels of the beef marketing system are 
technically related. Output at one level becomes input at some related 
(higher) level. The economic function of the beef marketing system is 
to effect coordination between what is desired by consumers and what 
is produced -- to create the time, form, place and possession utilities 
the modern consumer demands. How effectively these important tasks are 
performed is affected by the extent to which the various levels work 
together, the extent to which interlevel coordination of action is 
achieved. 
3 
In an open market exchange system, control of the various activi-
ties rests with different management centers. Conflict in goals or 
inconsistency in operational procedures between levels not only affects 
the degree of coordination but also has implication to pressures for 
change in the organizational structure of the entire marketing system. 
More information on the prevalence and implications of such conflicts 
or inconsistencies is sorely needed. This study attempts to provide 
such information for the feeder-packer subsector of the Oklahoma beef 
marketing system. 
Review of Literature 
A search of the available literature reveals several efforts which 
have indirect relevance to the problem. The more recent will be 
briefly described. 
A study by Purcell identifies limited perspectives of firms in the 
system, with related tendencies toward isolationist goals and operating 
policies, as an obstacle to effective communication in beef marketing 
8 systems. Tapp documents the existency of excessive pencil shrinks in 
carcass grade and weight sales of slaughter beef in Oklahoma. Such 
practices indicate a lack of coordination between the two levels where 
this technique of selling is concerned. 9 Logan estimates slaughtering 
costs per head for fat cattle increase by as much as 12 percent when 
10 the flow of cattle into the plant is variable rather than uniform. 
Clifton notes such variability encourages vertical integration by the 
packer back into cattle feeding, thus effecting a change in the organi-
11 zational structure of the system. 
4 
Efforts designed specifically to explore the economic implications 
of any interlevel goal conflicts and/or operational inconsistencies 
are missing. The costs of such conflicts, both to the system as a 
whole and to the individual operators within the system, are unknown. 
Such information is sorely needed to guide adjustments in procedure in 
the short-run and to direct changes in the organizational structure of 
the system over time. 
Objectives 
The overall objective of this study was to identify, and establish 
the economic implications of, important interlevel goal conflicts and/or 
operational inconsistencies in the packer-feeder subsector of the beef 
marketing system in Oklahoma. More specifically, the objectives were 
as follows: 
1. To identify decision criteria employed by management at the 
packing and feeding levels which affect the nature of inter-
level buying and selling activities; 
2. To identify interlevel goal conflicts and operational incon-
sistencies within the packer-feeder subsector of the beef 
marketing system; and 
3. To infer the implications of selected conflicts and/or incon-
sistencies to the level of coordination achieved by the 
packer-feeder subsector of the Oklahoma beef marketing system. 
Procedure 
There is no secondary source of the type of information needed to 
fulfill the stated objectives. Consequently, development of an appro-
priate procedure became an important part of the total study. 
5 
A conceptual framework was established using the available litera-
ture, interaction with trade personnel, and the insight of various 
university researchers interested in the problem area. Emphasis was 
placed on developing, conceptually, an understanding of why interlevel 
coordination within a marketing system is important and what implica-
tions can emerge when an acceptable level of coordination is not 
realized. 
Within the established framework, a total of six dimensions or 
facets of the total connection between the packer and feeder were 
selected. Identification or selection of each dimension was equiva-
lent to hypothesizing that significant conflicts or inconsistencies in 
procedure exists along that particular dimension. In general terms, 
the six dimensions chosen were: (1) overall goal of the operations, 
(2) attitudes toward level versus variability in returns (or costs), 
(3) product valuation, (4) market procedure, (5) attitudes toward 
various ways of achieving vertical coordination, and (6) opinions on 
performance of the market within which the managers are operating. 
Questionnaires were developed, based on the six dimensions, to 
isolate any conflicts or inconsistencies and establish a base for 
inferring implications to the performance of the system and the level 
of coordination achieved. Separate questionnaires were developed for 
the packing and feeding sectors; they are included in the thesis as 
Appendices A and B. Using a stratified random sampling procedure, a 
6 
total of 23 packers and 42 feeders were surveyed. More detailed infor-
mation on the characteristics of the sample is to be included in 
Chapters III and IV. 
A particular orientation was built into the questionnaires. Ques-
tions were planned on a "mirror image" basis to facilitate their pur-
pose of isolating conflicts or interlevel inconsistencies. For example, 
a set of questions was designed to establish feedlot managers' atti-
tudes toward level versus variability of returns. The related questions 
in the packer survey attempted to establish the packers' attitudes 
toward level versus variability of in-plant costs of the cattle they 
buy. Such an approach was considered necessary to isolate basic con-
flicts and interlevel operating problems. 
Additional questions were used to provide a more complete picture 
of the decision models used by the feeder and packer. Thus, not 
every question has a direct counterpart in the other questionnaire. No 
formal structure was maintained; questions relating to the same area 
were often scattered throughout the form to conceal the underlying pur-
pose of the questions. 
The questionnaires were completed by the author during July and 
August of 1969. Personal interviews were used due to the length of 
the questionnaires and the need for explanation in some areas to assure 
similar interpretation by the respondents. 
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7 James D. Shaffer, "Changing Orientations of Marketing Research," 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, L (1968), pp. 1437-1449. 
8wayne D. Purcell, An Appraisal of the Information System in Beef 
Marketing, Michigan State University Agricultural Economics Report 
No. 151 (East Lansing, 1969). 
9Ralph L. Tapp and Wayne D. Purcell, Variable Procedure in Car-
~ Grade and Weight Sales of Slaughter Beef: Implications to 
Oklahoma Cattle Feeders, Oklahoma Agricultural Experiment Station 
Bulletin B-669 (Stillwater, 1969). 
10 Samuel H. Logan, "The Effects of Short-Run Variations in 
Supplies of Cattle and Costs of Slaughtering in California," Journal 
of Farm Economics, XLV (1963), pp. 625-630. 
11Elliot s. Clifton, "Effect on the Meat-Packing Firm of Short-Run 




THE COORDINATION OF INTERLEVEL ACTIVITY 
Introduction 
There is no well organized and conceptually complete "theory" of 
marketing. The conceptual base for most analyses of marketing activity 
is a combination of marketing principles and basic tenets of economic 
theory. The base is often loosely formulated and situation oriented, 
designed specifically for a particular analysis. Historically, the 
orientation of researchers has leaned toward analysis of some one of 
the many related activities which comprise the total marketing effort. 
Consequently, the received literature offers little in terms of a con-
ceptual base for analysis of an entire marketing system or some subset 
within the entire system. A more productive base is needed, one 
directed toward analysis of interlevel activity. 
1 Vertical Coordination and Firm Theory 
A logical place to start in establishing a conceptual base is with 
the available theory of the firm. In examining certain concepts in the 
theory of the firm, the extent to which the theory can be adapted and 
brought to bear in systems analysis becomes more apparent. 
Basic to all economic activity is the concept of "production". 
Production may be considered in general terms as any activity that 
creates or adds form, space, or time utilities to a basic product. In 
8 
the firm, an arrangement of the production activities constitutes a 
"production line", the complete production process. Conceptually, 
these various activities are often viewed as a vertical continuum. 
9 
The basic product as raw material is converted to a finished product as 
it moves up the continuum. 
The firm is the organizational unit which conducts these activities. 
If the various activities are all performed by a single firm, the firm 
is also responsible for the coordination of these activities. The 
activities performed have been referred to as stages, with "stage" 
defined as "any operating process capable of producing a salable pro-
2 duct or service under appropriate circumstances." Thus, a stage has 
the potential to suffice as an economic base for an independently 
operating firm. A firm then may be made up of only one vertical stage 
or it may consist of many vertical stages. 
The notion of "stage theory" then emerges and can be represented 
graphically in the form of a grid as shown in Figure 1. The horizontal 
axis represents units of production and the vertical axis shows units 
of utility added at each production stage in the vertical stage-to-
stage movements of the raw product. The horizontal axis is relatively 
easy to understand since production is measured in units of output 
ordinarily used in marginal economic analysis. The vertical axis is 
less obvious. Utility is added by each successive activity as the 
product moves up the vertical continuum. Theoretically, an additional 
activity, which would lengthen the continuum, is justified only if the 
contribution to total utility inherent to the product is positive and 
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Figure 1. A Production Grid 
The total task to be performed in the production process can be 
likened to the area of the grid shown in Figure 1. If X units of raw 
material are pushed through the production line which generates Y units 
of utility per unit of finished product, then the total effort is 
conceptually at least -- the product XY. 
Generation of the Y units of utility inherent to each unit of pro-
duct can, as noted, be divided into a number of·stages. Similarly, the 
X units of product could be produced by a number of firms, each being 
comprised of one or more stages. 
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Figure 2 illustrates such a breakdown, showing three separate 
stages A, B, and C. Five separately controlled firms (a1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 , 
and a
5









) in stage B, etc. As shown, no firm is 
active at more than one stage. Conceptually, of course, several stages 
could be combined into one firm. 
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Figure 2. A Possible Breakdown of the Production Grid 
Into Stages and Firms 
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The number of stages and the number of horizontal units at each 
stage to include in a particular firm will depend upon the technical 
efficiency and capacity of the particular firms involved. The firm can 
extend itself either horizontally or vertically, but may eventually 
encounter increasing costs in either direction as its fixed resources 
are more fully utilized. Once having attained an equilibrium, any new 
change in technology or demand might call for further regrouping and 
restructuring. 
An entire industry can be represented by Figure 2. Each firm in 
the industry cluster, aj through cj, adds utility to the product as it 
moves vertically through the production process. Each stage produces a 
potentially salable product. By reducing the scope of activities to 
be considered, a meaningful subset can be generated for purposes of 
analysis. An example is shown in Figure 3 where attention is focused 
on activity at stages Band C. 
Utility 
(Y) 10 
c .. c .. I~-
Stage C .,_ ~ .., 
5 I 
Stage B 
'h 'h h I'\ h 
J. "i. ~ 4 .. -
' 
0 _........,.. -I 10 1 . - 5 20 Units of Product (X) 
Figure 3. A Product Grid Subset, Featuring Two Stages with 
Several Firms at Each Stage 
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It must be recognized that not all utilities are produced in a 
strict chronological order as suggested by the simple vertical process 
just outlined. The vertical concept best fits the concept of form 
utility. The product is continually modified as to form as it moves up 
through various stages. One can therefore picture the production pro-
cess as a multiplicity of converging lines of stages or as a fanshaped 
flow leading to a final product. Of course, envisioning the whole 
process as an assembly line is another way to grasp the concept of 
vertical stages. In any case, the stage concept and the vertical 
succession of stages in production provides assistance in conceptualiza-
tion and facilitates understanding of the concept of vertical coordina-
tion. 
Vertical Coordination and Economic Efficiency 
In combining several stages to produce a final product, there are 
at least two dimensions of the operation which affect the level of 
economic efficiency realized. The two are: (1) the level of output at 
the various stages, and (2) the timing of the product flow between the 
stages. 
Level of Output 
The relationship between cost per unit and level of output is a 
familiar component of the theory of the firm. Typically, consideration 
' is limited to the cost function for a single operation, which may be 
the composite of several stages as herein discussed. The typical 





Level of Output 
Figure 4. A Typical Average Total Cost (ATC) Curve 
14 
A number of analysts have attempted to break this "composite func-
tion" into its component parts and thereby isolate the costs of activity 
3 at the various stages. The work by French, Sammet, and Bressler in 
1956 and later efforts by Mighell and Jones4 in 1963 constitute primary 
examples. Such an approach deserves consideration when the degree of 
coordination between different stages or levels of activity is of pri-
mary concern. 
In Figure 5, ATC curves for three hypothetical stages, labeled I, 
II, and III are shown. Vertical distance in the graph is important; 
the distance below each curve and above the immediately.preceding curve 
denotes the cost of activities in that stage at various levels of out-
put. Thus, the vertical distance between curves I and II is indicative 






Level of Output 
Figure 5. ATC Curves for Three Economic Stages 
Through selective adjustment of the placement of the three func~ 
tions, the problems of coordinating the.vertical stages to keep the 
total cost down can be illustrated. Since activity at the various 
15 
stage levels involves different economic functions, there is no guaran-
tee the minimum point on the cost curves will occur at the same level 
of output. In fact, the atypical case would be the one in which minimum 
costs per unit for the various stages occur at the same level of output. 
Close coordination of the various stages in terms of level of output is 
therefore very important. In Figure 6, any level of output outside the 
segment AB will result in a substantial increase.in.the cost of the 
three combined stages. This means careful decision processes are 
required in (1) deciding on the level of output in stage I, and (2) 
deciding on what part, if any, of the output of stage I or other 






A B Level of Output 
Figure 6. ATC Curves Illustrating the Importance of 
Coordinating Output Through All 
Vertical Stages 
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When stages I, II, and III are controlled by.a single management 
center, the need for coordinating output at the three related stages 
will usually be apparent. Additionally, control of all stages provides 
the medium through which the needed coordination can be realized. 
If the three stages are under the control-of separate management 
centers, the situation is much different. The needed.coordination must 
be realized externally to the firm -- the element of.control over all 
the stages is missing, The price mechanism and.related-negotiated 
exchange procedures are called upon to effect the needed.coordination. 
If the minimum points on the ATC curves_occur at different.levels of 
output, the task might become one of coordinating the.output of many 
firms at one stage with the input needs of a single large firm at a 
17 
related level or stage. Many possibilities, many combinations of sizes 
and stages, are of course possible. 
Under conditions of separate management control~.the.requisites to 
coordination between the stages are essentially.the.same.as in the case 
where all stages are under control of.a single management center. 
First, there must be an understanding of the cost structure.or, more 
generally, how the various activities are.conducted.in other stages. 
Clearly, this understanding is a necessary condition to effective inter-
stage coordination. 
But understanding alone does not constitute a.sufficient condition. 
There must also be an economic incentive, some.reason for.management 
at each.level to want to coordinate with those operating.at.related 
levels or stages of activity. If coordination-means reduced-cost of 
operation, then the entrepreneur who seeks.to .. effect-such .. coordination 
must believe he will be rewarded --.must believe.he-will receive some 
of the benefits of the decreased cost. There would.appear to be at 
least two barriers to voluntary efforts.toward.coordination. First, 
the matter of ignorance emerges. If a change.is-required to realize 
the benefits of increased coordination between.stages, then there is a 
tendency to maintain the status quo. Change.means.uncertainty, and 
logical arguments on paper to support the change are not always 
convincing. 
A second factor is that of economic structure •. _If.an imbalance 
in bargaining power exists, the same lack.of balance.in payoff to more 
coordinated action may prevail. In a structure approaching atomistic 
conditions, change is not realized easily. The benefits of change may 
not materialize until all (or nearly all) participants have made the 
18 
adjustment. But the transition is seldom quick or smooth. A coordi-
nated program between participants in stages I and II may be predicated 
upon the cooperation of participants in state III -- which.may or may 
not be forthcoming when there are many such relatively small firms. 
Timing of Product Flow 
The timing of the flow of the product may be equally as important 
as the level of output. And like "level of output", the timing of the 
flow may have implications to per unit cost. 
Abstracting from the problem.of level.of output, Figure 7 shows 
the problems which can arise due to timing •. Unless the stages are 
independent, each stage depends upon the.stage.immediately below it (on 
the vertical continuum) for inputs. If the flow.is not relatively 
smooth or continuous and the "input".available.when needed,.the.results 
are: (1) higher costs due to departures.from.the-range of.output where 
per unit costs are lowest, and/or (2) higher.costs .because the product 
must carry a higher per unit fixed cost, since fixed costs are typi-
cally a function of time. 
The presentation in Figure 7 surely overstates.the.flexibility in 
timing of the various stages. The purpose is.to.illustrate that if 
transfer of the product from stage I to stage.II-is.delayed until time 
B instead of at time A, the proper time, .the.cost-which must be 
attributed to activities of stage II increase. As illustrated, the 
increase in cost per unit would be of magnitude.C.C~. 
As before, the matter of timing will not.become a.problem of 
crucial importance when all stages are under.the control of a single 
management unit. The needed timing can be "forced" -- a move as simple 
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as staggering the starting work hours of the labor force in the various 
stages may solve the problem. A primary function of.stage I is to move 
the product of stage I, the input for stage II, in a smooth and timely 
flow. Other functions of stage I, even the "profit" function, may be 
of secondary importance. Performance of the total, the combined stages, 
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Figure 7. ATC Curves Illustrating the Importance of 
Coordination in the Timing of Activity 
at the Various Stage Levels 
And as before, wheri the various stages are.controlled by separate 
management centers, interstage coordination will not_be guaranteed. 
The potential problems associated with timing of the technically related 
activities must be recognized. There must be some-economic incentive 
for management at one level to coordinate with management at other 
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levels. If the open market exchange system fails .. to _overcome . these 
barriers, then cost of performing the.activities of-the combined stages 
may be higher than under the alternative of an integrated system where 
all stages are controlled by a single management. 
Pricing Efficiency 
The possible impact of the lack of coordination.on per.unit costs 
has been illustrated. This is a form of economic.efficiency, often 
called technical efficiency, where output per unit of input is the 
primary consideration. There is another type of economic efficiency 
which may be equally as important. 
Pricing efficiency refers to the ability ar_capacity of a market-
ing system to effect a high degree of.coordination.between what is 
needed or desired by consumers and what. is .. produced. ___ This . concept is 
more di£ ficul t to illus tr ate graphically. . In .. a -.very real- sense, how-
ever, the issue of pricing efficiency has.been-discussed •. If coordina-
tion between the vertical stages is. realized,_ then '.'pricing efficiency" 
will be realized as well. Vertical coordination.means.recognition of 
needs at the various stages, including.quality.attributes,.and con-
verting this recognition into a continuum of stages which effectively 
bridges the gap between consumer and producer •. 
When dealing with an integrated system, . the_ term. '.'pricing 
efficiency" is a misnomer. In an integrated.system, prices are not 
negotiated between the stages •. But when separate.management of the 
various. stages prevails, . price. negotiation .becomes .. very. important. If 
pricing efficiency is to be realized, then a.system.of.price signals --
premiums and discounts -- must be properly tied to product attributes 
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of quality and passed through all the stages. Understanding of why 
this is important becomes a necessary.prerequisite-to.the.realization 
of such a system. Economic incentive to promote such a system provides 
the sufficient conditions for its.realization •. --· ... 
Within a single firm or under.a.single.management.center, the 
coordinating of quality needs at the various stage.levels is.sure to 
receive attention. When the output of.stage.I.is.not.suitable.as .input 
for stage II, adjustments will be made •. In an.open.market.system, such 
adjustments are not automatic. Coordination of.effort.between.differ-
ent management centers is required and, .as.noted,.either.lack of under-
standing and/or a perceived lack of economic incentive may prevent such 
coordination from developing. 
Summary 
The performance of any sequence.of economic.activities can be 
meaningfully divided into.stages. The.output-of.any.one.stage.is a 
salable product or, under.appropriate.circumstances~-input to a related 
stage. By proper grouping of these.economic stages.a theoretical 
vertical continuum, stretching from producer to consumer, can be 
developed. 
Several stages can be performed by a single.firm •. Indeed, the 
typical average total cost curve (ATC) in.the theory of the firm is 
often a composite function, showing the per unit cost of.the output of 
some combination of stages. Alternatively, each.stage can be under the 
control of a separate management. In this case, .the element of control 
over all stages is missing. Coordination of the vertical stages must 
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be achieved through open market exchange processes rather.than through 
administrative decree as when all stages are controlled by a single 
management center. 
Lack of coordination in the level of output.and/or the timing of 
operations at the various stages can significantly.increase the cost 
of the final output of the combined stages •.. Within the.firm, coordina-
tion can be "forced" given the prevailing degree. of control. - .With 
separate management of the various stages, coordination is.less likely 
to be realized. Failure to understand the-need for coordination and/or 
failure to see any economic incentive for coordinated action can block 
the realization of higher levels of coordination. 
Failure to achieve coordination vertically.through the marketing 
system both increases per unit costs of producing goods or services and 
blocks the realization of a high level of pricing efficiency. If the 
failures are sufficiently costly to management.at.any one.level, then 
an incentive to integrate so as to gain an element.of control over 
activity at related levels would be expected to develop. This would 
mean integration arising from the inadequacies of an open market 
exchange system. 
FOOTNOTES 
1Mighell and Jones use the term "vertical.coordination".to include 
all the ways in which the vertical stages are controlled and directed. 
Ronald Mighell and Lawrence Jones, Vertical Coordination in Agriculture, 
Agricultural Economics Report No. 19, Economic Res~arcb Service USDA 
(Washington, 1963). · 
2 Ibid., p. 7. 
3B. C. French, L. L. Sammet, and R. G. Bressler, "Economi~ Effi-
ciency in Plant Operations With Special Reference to the Marketing of 
California Pears," Hilgardia, XXIV (Berkley, 1956), pp. 544-579. 
4 Mighell and Jones, pp. 19-34. 
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CHAPTER III 
PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION OF FEEDLOT SURVEY RESULTS 
In this chapter the feedlot data are analyzed. Factors such as 
attitudes, goals, and marketing procedure will be presented and impli-
cations dr?wn as to their impact on marketing procedures in the feedlot 
sector. Certain attributes of the feedlot itself, and management per-
sonnel, are analyzed on a selective basis for any effect _on goals, 
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attitudes, marketing procedure and other operational procedures. These 
various facets are presented in an attempt to determine the decision 
model used by the feedlot operator in marketing his product. 
Presentation and Interpretation of Feedlot Data 
The data from the feedlot questionnaires can be broken into three 
parts: (1) structural and operational characteristics; (2) managerial 
characteristics; and (3) potential areas of conflict. 
General Structural and Operational Characteristics 
General structural and operational characteristics are presented 
in the following tables dealing with selected facets of the 42 feedlots 
surveyed. Two of these characteristics, feedlot size and level of 
equity in the business, will be examined later to determine if there is 
any correlation between these factors and selected marketing practices. 
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The feedlots are divided into five capacity levels (Table I). 
This is one-time capacity, not yearly. The categories are broad and 
facilitate isolation of differences in operations due to size. The 
number of lots in each capacity level reflects the organizational struc-
ture of feeding operations in the state. 
TABLE I 
DISTRIBUTION OF THE SAMPLE FEEDLOTS BY 
CAPACITY OF OPERATION 














Concerning the amount of custom feeding, the tendency is towards 
all or none (Table II). Only 11 of the 42 lots reported custom feeding 
activity. Much of the custom feeding is done by the larger feedlots; 
many of the smaller lots do no custom feeding at all. 
Feedlot owners were questioned as to the percent equity in their 
business operation. Twenty-six of the 42 lots (almost 62 percent) are 
included in the 100 percent equity class. Eleven of the 42 lots 
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(slightly over 25 percent) have less than 50 percent equity in the busi-
ness. Equity tends to decrease as the size of the feedlots increases, 
showing the larger capital investment in the lot and lower initial 
investment on a percentage basis (Table III). Equity tends to increase 
with the age of the owner-manager and with the number of years the 
feedlot has been in operation. This suggests the business is paying 
off over time and the owners' equity in the operation is growing. 
TABLE II 
CUSTOM FEEDING BY SIZE OF OPERATION 
Capacity of Lot Total Number Number Custom 
(Head) Lots Feeding 
0-500 12 1 
501-1,000 11 0 
1,001-5,000 11 5 
5,001-20,000 6 3 
over 20,000 2 2 
Almost 60 percent of the lots have been in operation 10 years or 
less. When comparing years in operation to size, there is a tendency 
for the larger lots to have been in operation a shorter time than the 

















PERCENT EQUITY IN BUSINESS RELATED TO NUMBER 
AND SIZE OF THE FEEDLOTS 
No. No. hI Size of Lot ~Headl 
Lots 0-500 501-1,000 1,001-5,000 5,001-20,000 
5 0 2 0 1 
6 3 1 0 2 
4 2 0 2 0 
1 0 1 0 0 
26 7 7 9 3 
TABLE IV 
NUMBER YEARS IN OPERATION RELATED TO NU1'IBER 
AND SIZE OF THE FEEDLOTS 
No. hX Size of Lot (Head) 
Lots 0-500 501-1,000 1,001-5,000 5,001-20,000 
10 5 2 0 1 
14 4 6 3 1 
6 1 1 2 2 
4 1 1 1 1 















General Characteristics of the Feedlot Managers 
Some of the more important variables that may affect the decisions 
of managers in both the production and marketing activities of the feed-
lot sector are age, experience in feeding, length of management tenure, 
and the structure of management (manager or owner-manager). These 
factors are considered in the following text and tables. Two of the 
factors, age and experience in feeding, were selected and will be stu-
died in further detail to see how they relate to the feeder's decision 
model. 
Thirty-five of the 42 lots are operated by owner-managers. Six 
lots are operated by managers hired for that purpose. Decisions con-
cerning feedlot operations could vary depending on whether the operator 
is an owner-manager or strictly a manager. When comparing age, exper-
ience, and length of management tenure with structure of management, 
the following relationships are found: the majority of owner-managers 
are in the 30-39 and 40-49 age groups; managers tend to fall in all age 
groups with slightly more in the 60-and-over category; most managers 
have 10 years or less experience in the cattle feeding business, while 
owner-managers were spread about evenly through all experience cate-
gories; and a slightly larger percentage of managers have over 20 years 
experience (Table V). 
For managers, the length of management tenure corresponds closely 
to experience in feeding. All in the manager group have been managers 
10 years or less. Looking at the same classification for owner-managers, 
there seems to be a tapering off point at the 10-year level. Over half 
of the owner-managers are included in the 0-5 and 6-10 year length of 
management tenure categories. 
TABLE V 
MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE RELATED TO YEARS EXPERIENCE IN CATTLE FEEDING 
AND YEARS EXPERIENCE IN FEEDLOT MANAGEMENT 
Years Experience in Years Experience in 
Feedlot Management Cattle Feeding 
Classification 0-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 >20 0-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 
(No. in Category) (No. in Category) 
Hired Manager 3 4 0 0 0 1 5 0 0 
Owner-Manager 8 15 5 3 4 6 6 7 6 





Six-areas of potential conflict in operational and marketing activ-
ity were selected. Each area is discussed and interpreted as to its 
effects on the decisions involved. Each area is also examined for any 
apparent relationship between the selected factors of age, size, experi-
ence, or percent equity and the decision processes of management in 
the feedlot sector. 
Overall Economic Goal or Objective 
Operators were presented four goals and asked to select the one 
best fitting their operations. A fifth choice, providing for a write-
in answer, was also provided (Appendix A, question II). The goals were 
structured to range from profit maximization per lot of cattle to a 
satisficing position for the operation on an annual basis. Each com-
bination of goals was considered to be significantly different in 
terms of how the manager would try to coordinate with related operations 
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(to be analyzed in Chapter V). Twenty-four of the 42 feeders chose the 
operational goal calling for maximization of profits on each lot of 
cattle. This amounts to 57 percent of the sample, but 83 percent of 
the feedlot capacity represented by the 41 feeders who responded to the 
question (Table VI). 
TABLE VI 
FEEDLOT MANAGERS' CHOICE OF GOALS FOR THEIR 
RESPECTIVE OPERATION 
Goal 
I. Try to maximize the return 
per head for each lot of 
cattle you handle. 
II. Try to maximize the returns 
to your total operation 
over some specific period 
of time (such as each year 
of operation) • 
III. Try to realize some chosen 
rate of return on your 
investment (which may be 
expressed in terms of per-
cent return or margin per 
head). 
IV. Seek some stable or con-
stant return which you 
have decided is accept-
able for your particular 
operation. 
V. If none of the above fit 
your case, please describe 


























Table VII relates the choice of operating goals to capacity, per-
cent equity and years experience in feeding. There is no strong rela-
tionship between goals chosen and either percent equity or years experi-
ence. Some tendency to move to the strict maximization goal (Goal I) 
is shown for the operations with low equity. Years experience does not 
appear to be an important determinant of which goal was selected. A 
more obvious relationship between goal choice and capacity appears. 
The larger operators, from a capacity of 1,000 head through the much 
larger operations, chose the goals involving maximization (Goals I and 
II). None of the operations in this size range selected goals III or 
IV. The smaller feeders appear more likely to go for a stable or con-
sistent rate of return. 
As a check to see if the feeders would stay with the goal they 
chose, a related question was developed concerning the pattern of per-
formance they would like to see their operation follow. Four patterns 
were presented and the choices were designed to be inversely correlated 
to the goals presented in Table VI. 
The performance patterns were as follows: 
I. The business consistently yields an average yearly net return 
of 6 percent on the initial investment. Operating policies 
(including buying and selling procedures) will not be changed 
until there is indication the return will drop below six per-
cent. Then adjustments in operating procedures are made in 
trying to keep the return at or around six percent. 
II. The business returns five to nine percent on the initial 
investment (has averaged seven percent) but adjustments are 









CHOICE OF GOALS RELATED TO CAPACITY, PERCENT EQUITY 
AND YEARS EXPERIENCE IN FEEDING 
CaEacity (No. Head) 
501- 1,001- 5,001- Percent Eguity 
500 1,000 5,000 20,000 >20,000 0-24 25-49 50-74 75-99 100 
6 6 5 5 2 5 4 2 0 13 
1 1 5 1 0 0 0 2 0 6 
0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
3 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 
2 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 
Years Experience 
in Feeding 
0-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 >20 
4 7 4 2 7 
0 3 0 1 4 
1 1 0 0 0 
1 0 2 0 1 
1 0 1 1 0 
w 
N 
selling procedures) in an attempt to increase the yearly 
average net return to eight to nine percent. 
33 
III. The business earns a reasonable return on the initial invest-
ment, but adjustments are made in operating policies (includ-
ing buying and selling procedures) when there appears to be 
a way to increase yearly net returns. 
IV. The business operates under the rule that adjustments in 
operating policies (including buying and selling procedures) 
are made so as to make the net returns on each lot of cattle 
as large as possible. 
The patterns were structured to yield a high inverse correlation 
between the patterns of performance and the alternative goals (pattern 
IV was structured to be consistent with goal I, pattern III with goal 
II, etc.). Table VIII shows the relationship based on actual response 
to the two question areas. Expected frequencies (assuming a correlation 
of -1.0) are shown in parentheses, actual frequencies are the entries 
which are not enclosed in parentheses. Both are based on the number of 
responses to this particular question. 
Recognizing the difficulties in structuring the performance pat-
terns so that a correlation of -1.0 with the choice of goals could rea-
sonably be expected, the results shown in Table VIII are surprisingly 
consistent. Since both "patterns" III and IV involve efforts to maxi-
mize, it is not surprising to see both related to goals I and II. Less 
consistency is observed in the other alternatives; the expected rela-
tionships between goal III and pattern II, goal IV and pattern I did 
not materialize. Whether this is due to the few observations, 
34 
inadequacies in the questions, inconsistencies on the part of the man-
agers or some combination of the three is not known. 
TABLE VIII 
THE RELATIONSHIP OF GOAL CHOICES TO SELECTED 



























Feedlot operators were questioned to determine how much "trade-off" 
they will accept between the level and variability in returns. The 
question devised contained five choices with level of average net 
returns for the year ranging from $2.00 to $6.00 per head (Appendix A, 
question IX). The pattern of returns, by months, within the year was 
also shown for each different level of annual returns. The variability 
in returns for the five choices was arranged such that variability in 
pattern II was twice that in pattern I, variability in pattern III was 
three times that in pattern I, etc. One sales figure per month was 
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used for reasons of simplicity. In each 12-month group of returns, 
except the $2.00 and $3.00 level, there were both gains and losses. 
The higher levels of returns were associated with the higher levels of 
variability and vice-versa for the lower levels of returns. The costs 
of getting the cattle to market were assumed to be equal under all 
patterns. 
Feeders were asked to examine the patterns of returns and choose 
the one they would prefer to face if they knew they would be faced with 
that pattern year after year. Over 50 percent of the feeders chose 
pattern III, the highest net returns and also the most variable (Table 
IX). In this pattern of returns, there were three chances for losses 
and one chance to break even, so four months out of twelve the operation 
will not make any money. Second choice was the $5.00 level of returns 
and the next most variable pattern. In this choice, there were two 
chances out of twelve to lose money on the operation, one chance to 
break even. 
As a check to see if operators would stay with this pattern of 
responses, a related question was asked later during the interview 
period. Average yearly net returns were held constant at $4.00 per 
head for all patterns of returns (Appendix A, question XIII). This 
time, slightly over half chose pattern number II. This is the most 
stable pattern of returns with no losses. The second choice when net 
returns were constant was pattern number I with two chances for losses. 
Five of the operators chose this pattern (Table X). 
The choices on patterns of returns were compared with age, equity, 
experience, and capacity. With variable net returns, operators tend to 








FEEDLOT OPERATORS' CHOICES BETWEEN LEVEL OF RETURNS AND VARIABILITY 
OF RETURNS: NET RETURNS VARIABLE 
Average Net Returns Per Head from 12 Monthly 
Net Returns Sales--"Boxed" Figures Represent 
No. Feeders for the Year Losses ($ Eer Head) 
Choosing ($ per Head) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 4 5 ill 4 1 9 3 7 ill 10 3 
1 2 0 3 1 2 1 1 3 4 3 1 
22 6 ill 5 6 13 0 12 9 ill 15 6 
1 3 2 5 0 4 2 ill 7 4 2 1 























FEEDLOT OPERATORS' CHOICES BETWEEN LEVEL OF RETURNS AND VARIABILITY 
OF RETURNS: NET RETURNS CONSTANT 
Average Net Returns Per Head from 12 Monthly 
Net Returns Sales--"Boxed" Figures Represent 
No. Feeders for the Year Losses ($ eer Head) 
Choosing ($ per Head) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
5 4 5 1 ill 3 4 10 ill 9 3 7 
22 4 3 5 4 3 3 6 5 5 2 5 
1 4 9 5 ill 11 9 IIJ 10 [II 12 rn 
2 4 3 5 7 0 1 5 3 8 2 6 















capacity. There was no apparent relationship between patterns of 
returns and these factors. With constant net returns, the operators 
tend to choose patterns I and II independently of age, experience, 
equity, or capacity. 
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With the choices of patterns III and V under variable yearly aver-
age net returns, it appears that feedlot operators are willing to make 
the "trade-off" between the level of, and variability in, returns. 
Most operators are enough of a gambler to shoot for higher average net 
returns and take the associated losses in stride. This is expected 
more in large feedlot operations where volume of business can help to 
average out the losses. However, this "trade-off" was not expected to 
be so prevalent in the smaller lots where variability in returns pre-
sents a more serious problem. When the ma.gnitude of loss has a greater 
effect on operations, operators might be expected to take a lower aver-
age return if increased stability in returns is realized by doing so. 
Due to the smallness of operations, volume cannot be expected to aver-
age out the losses. This, however, is not the choice that was made. 
Even more of an inconsistency exists under the situation where 
average yearly net returns are constant for all patterns of returns. 
The selection of pattern I by a number of the feeders is surprising. 
Pattern number IV ranks second in terms of stability and average net 
returns for the year are constant. But, only two operators chose 
pattern IV. Pattern number I shows an increase of 50 percent in vari-
ability compared to pattern IV. This appears to be an irrational 
choice on the part of the five feedlot operators. The only explanation 
to offer is that operators noticed the higher net. returns during the 
monthly sales ($10, $9, and $7 in pattern I compared to $8, $7, and $6 
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in pattern IV) and chose to try and hit these higher monthly returns. 
The months in which these higher returns occur may have affected the 
decision of some operators even though they were instructed not to view 
the patterns as running through a calendar year. 
Coordination of Market Activity 
Another important area of interest was the attitude of feeders to-
ward alternative ways of achieving increased vertical coordination. 
Three "types'' of coordination were considered in the survey. First, 
feedlot owners were questioned on their attitudes towards vertical inte-
gration. This was done through a series of questions on the structure 
or pattern of ownership in feedlot operations. 
Feedlot owners were split on their answers to questions concerning 
whether packers should be allowed to own feedlots. Nineteen feeders 
replied "no" and 19 replied "yes". However, feeders are willing to 
allow packers to custom feed cattle in lots owned by others as almost 
67 percent replied "yes". Feeders were also asked if they were now or 
had ever considered "buying into" a packing plant. Sixty-nine percent 
replied "no" and gave various reasons why. Some of the more frequent 
reasons are "not enough capital, not interested, packing is another 
phase of the business, run a family operation, not enough time, etc." 
The feeders that answered "yes" supported their answer with such rea-
soning as "use the packing plant to process our own beef, the packing 
plant provides a sure market outlet, and we are trying to increase 
total profits." Feedlot operators are very much against allowing a 
packer to "buy into" their feeding operations as 35 of the 42 operators 
replied "no". The most often given reasons for this choice were 
"running a family operation and do not want to change, do not desire 
additional partners, do not want to be obligated to a packer, and do 
not care to expand operations." The few operators that replied "yes" 
felt it would establish a ready market for their cattle and/or permit 
them to run more cattle. 
There seemed to be no apparent relationships between the answers 
to such questions and age, experience, equity, or size. The answers 
were independent of these factors. 
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The second form of coordination covered was through contractual 
arrangements, especially contract selling of slaughter cattle. 
Currently, contractual selling of slaughter cattle by Oklahoma feedlot 
operators plays only a minor role in the beef marketing system. How-
ever, the use of forward contracting is expected to increase in the 
future. 
As a starting point, several variables considered important in a 
contract were listed and the feeders were asked to rank these variables 
in order of importance. The feeders were first asked to rank the 
variables in accordance with what they, the feedlot owners, feel 
should be given primary attention in the contract. Next the operators 
were asked to rank the variables in accordance with what they thought 
the packer-buyer with whom they dealt would consider important in the 
contract. Then the feeders were asked to compare the lists and if 
they differed, to indicate why. The operators made their choices from 
a list of eight variables as follows: 
(1) Specify the scales on which the cattle are to be weighed. 
(2) Specify the exact time of day for weighing. 
(3) Specify when transfer of title to the cattle is to take 
place. 
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(4) Specify an exact pencil shrink. 
(5) Guarantee a minimum dressing percentage with a specific 
schedule of price discounts for falling short of the guaran-
teed level, a schedule o£premiums if the cattle dress higher. 
(6) Guarantee a certain percentage to grade Choice with a speci-
fied price discount for falling short, a premium for exceed-
ing the guaranteed level. 
(7) Specify the basic price per cwt. you are to be paid at the 
time the contract is established. 
(8) Make provisions for price to be based on the price at some 
chosen market on the day of delivery or for a certain day 
during the week of delivery. 
Using these numbers to identify the variable or consideration, Table XI 
shows how the feeders respond to the questions posed. 
In interpreting Table XI, it is important to recognize not all 
feeders ranked all variables. The feeders were asked to rank all 
those variables they considered important. Variable (7), dealing with 
a specification of price, was clearly first in both rankings. The 
only variable for which the rankings appeared to be significantly 
different was Variable (1), dealing with a specification of scales on 
which the cattle are to be weighed. The feeders apparently feel the 
packer attaches relative less importance to this particular variable; 
only 16 feeders ranked it at all and the weighted rankings was sixth. 
Differences in the ranking given other variables, such as Variable (5), 
must be discounted in view of the small number of feeders who consid-
ered it important enough to rank. The rankings are based on weighted 
averages, assigning a value of "8" for first, "7" for second, etc. 
Feedlot owners and managers were also asked for their opinions con-
cerning contracting of slaughter cattle with packers. Five choices 
were presented to the operators. It was explained to the operators 
TABLE XI 
FEEDERS' RANKING OF IMPORTANT CONTRACT VARIABLES 
Feeders Ranking of the 
Feeders Ranking of the No. Feeders Variable (What Feeders 
Variable Variable (What Feeders Ranking This Feel the Packer Views 
Number View as Important) Variable as Important) 
(1) Fourth 23 Sixth 
(2) Second 30 Third 
(3) Seventh 17 Eighth 
(4) Fifth 31 Fourth 
(5) Eighth 6 Fifth 
(6) Third 11 Second 
(7) First 29 First 















that the contracts referred to were made after the cattle were put on 
feed. 
Table XII records the choices presented the feeders and the distri-
bution of replies from those who responded. The most prevalent "write-
in" suggested the feeder would contract if a profit is likely or could 
be guaranteed. There are no apparent relationships between the atti-
tudes expressed and years experience in feeding, percentage equity, or 
capacity of the operation. 
TABLE XII 
FEEDERS' ATTITUDE TOWARD CONTRACT SELLING TO PACKERS 
Choice 
I am in favor of such contracts since they guarantee 
a market. 
I will contract if the packer will pay a premium 
above the "going market price" at time of delivery. 
I will not contract under any conditions since this 
prevents the packer from having to compete for 
cattle in the open market. 
I will contract at the "going market price" at the 
time of delivery since this assures the packer a 
steady supply of cattle and this leads to better 
working relations with the packer. 
If none of the above are suitable, please indicate 









A third potentially important contributor to economic activity and 
to the degree of stability in the cattle feeding business is the futures 
market. Other surveys have revealed little hedging is done by Oklahoma 
feeders, so questions were designed to determine whether the futures 
market becomes an integral part of the feeder's decision processes in 
other selected ways. 
One set of questions related to the impact, if any, of futures 
quotes on the price the feeder would pay for feeder cattle. The feeders 
were told to assume it was June 1. Any cattle purchased would "finish" 
and be ready for market in early October. Then, an effort was made to 
determine what factors are most important in the feeder's decision on 
how much to pay for feeder cattle. 
A number of factors were mentioned, including cost of gain, feed 
cost, current slaughter cattle market, season of the year, market out-
look for fat cattle, etc. But the factor which ranked first based on 
frequency of occurrence was, or related closely to, current quotes for 
futures contracts. 
Feeders were then asked to decide how much they would pay for 
feeder cattle with the October futures contract trading at $30 per 
hundredweight on June 1. In an attempt to isolate the extent to which 
futures quotes affect the price they would pay, the operators were then 
presented two alternative situations and the changes in their decisions 
recorded. In situation I, the June 1 market for the October 
futures contract is $28 instead of $30 (Table XIII). Over 70 percent, 
22 of 30 who responded, would not pay as much for the feeder cattle. 
Only eight percent were willing to pay the same amount as with the $30 
futures quote. None of the feeders were willing to pay more for the 
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feeder cattle. Comparing these choices to the factors of age, experi-
ence, and size brought out no apparent relationships. 
TABLE XIII 
FEEDLOT MANAGERS' ADJUSTMENTS IN PRICE OFFERS FOR FEEDER CATTLE IN 
RESPONSE TO CHANGING PRICES OF LIVE CATTLE FUTURES 
Choice 
Would be willing to pay 
less for the cattle. 
Would be willing to pay 
the same for the cattle. 
Would be willing to pay 
more for the cattle. 
No. Feeders Choosing 
I. Futures Price II. Futures Price 
Drops from $30 to Rises to $32 from 




In situation II the June 1 quotation for the October futures con-
tract is $32 instead of the $30 and the same possible changes were 
allowed. Eighteen of the 30 feeders were willing to pay more for the 
feeder cattle, 11 would pay the same. Only one feeder chose to pay 
less. It appears the futures market is used by feeders as a predictive 
mechanism since what they would pay for feeder cattle varies with the 
"predictions" of the futures market. 
In another question feedlot managers were quizzed on the hedging 
of cattle, a more legitimate use of the futures market. In this 
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situation they were asked to assume the following: 
It is around June 1 and you are putting feeder cattle in your·· lot. 
You estimate the costs of getting your steers to market weight in 
early October to be $27 per cwt. This $27 includes the purchase 
price of the feeders, vet expenses, feed, a lot or "yardage" cost, 
etc. 
Considering this information the feeders were asked if they would con-
sider hedging cattle. If so, they were asked to indicate what the June 
1 quote for October futures would have to be in order for them to hedge 
the cattle. If they would not hedge, they were asked to.briefly explain 
why. 
Twenty-six of 39 feeders who answered noted they would not hedge 
the cattle. Several reasons were given for the "no" answer. Many 
operators had never used the futures market and felt they didn't know 
enough about its operation. Others felt that hedging eliminated the 
chance of large profits and they would rather assume all the risk in 
exchange for the chance at the larger profits. Several other feeders 
felt that since they bought and sold cattle on the same market, they 
had a built-in hedge. Other reasons given were that there was no real 
advantage to hedging cattle, the hedge had never worked to the opera-
tor's satisfaction, and some had lost before on hedging and were 
"soured" on the futures market. 
Thirteen of the 39 feeders indicated they would consider hedging. 
Of these 13 feeders, eight indicated the June 1 quote for the October 
futures contract would have to be in the $28-29 range for them to hedge. 
The remaining five indicated a price in the $30-31 range. Presumably, 
the feeders were giving the minimum quotes and all would hedge if prices 
were still higher. Note that all levels indicated they would permit 
the locking in of a positive margin when the hedge is established. 
Market Procedure 
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A fourth area of primary interest which affects the market opera-
tions of feeders is the marketing procedure followed. This facet of the 
feedlot operation covers all phases of marketing activities from sell-
ing procedures to price forecasting. In a sense, it concerns all the 
technical activities of the marketing function. 
Feeders were asked to select their typical selling procedure from 
the following three alternatives: 
1. Sell at least 50 percent on a liveweight basis; 
2. Sell at least 50 percent on a carcass grade and weight or 
other carcass evaluation basis; and 
3. Sell 50-50 on liveweight and carcass basis. 
Twenty-five of the 42 feeders sell predominantly on a liveweight 
basis, 13 on a carcass evaluation basis, and four sell on a combined 
liveweight-carcass evaluation basis. The only obvious relationship to 
the selected operational characteristics is a tendency for the smaller 
lots, less than 5,000 head capacity, to sell on a carcass evaluation 
basis. The larger lots typically sell liveweight. 
Most feeders sell through a number of outlets and have access to 
even more. Twenty-six of 39 feeders who responded to questions relating 
to this area receive from two to five bids on their cattle. Examining 
the other side of this.issue, 34 of the 39 reported they do not supply 
the majority of cattle bought by any particular packer. 
Those feeders who sell cattle on the basis that a certain percent-
age will grade Choice were asked if premiums or discounts are agreed 
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upon if the percentage grading Choice turn out to be high or low respec-
tively. Fifteen of the 21 feeders involved in this question area 
report no such use of premiums or discounts. The remaining six agree 
the premiums and discounts, when employed, are approximately equal in 
absolute value. 
If feeders sell cattle on a liveweight basis, they were asked which 
of the following situations they would prefer the buyer to be in as 
negotiations are begun for the sale of cattle: 
I. The packer has access to your records providing information 
on dressing percentage, carcass cut-out percentage (yield 
grade), quality grade, etc. for previous cattle you have fed. 
II. You have given the packer a summary (written or oral) of the 
percent of your cattle which grade Choice (and Good, Prime, 
etc.), of average dressing percentages, and average carcass 
cut-out percentages (yield grade) for previous cattle you 
have fed. 
III. You make the cattle available to the packer-buyer for his 
inspection, but offer no additional information other than 
number of days on feed and type of feed fed. 
Of 39 feeders who responded, 11 chose situation I, 10 chose situa-
tion II, and 18 chose situation III. Thus, 21 of the 39 feeders 
expressed a willingness to make available much of the information the 
packer would be likely to want or need (situations I and II). This 
willingness to provide information is supported by such reasoning as 
"want the buyer to come back", "more information should increase the 
price offered", and "I have nothing to hide". Those choosing situation 
II over situation I generally felt situation I is too detailed and 
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somewhat impractical. Feeders choosing situation III indicated they do 
not have the information (called for in I and II), the buyer knows the 
quality from previous experience, or they feel such information would 
give the packer to much of an advantage as negotiations are begun. 
In order to shed more light on the operators' opinions about the 
market in which they operate, feeders were questioned on how they make 
the decision on number of cattle to feed. The basic purpose of this 
question area was to determine the importance and use of market outlook 
information in this decision and the sources of price information 
employed. 
Twenty-six of 41 feeders responding noted they do not vary the 
number of cattle fed with the market outlook. Rather, they keep the 
lot as full as possible subject to turnover of their cattle inventory. 
Reasons for such an approach include the following: 
1. Buy and sell regularly to "average outn prices; 
2. Do not want to try to "out guess" the market; 
3. Need volume in a custom operation; and 
4. Try to keep per unit fixed costs down. 
The 15 feeders who do vary feeding level on the basis of market 
outlook were asked to rank various sources of information as to import-
ance. Most importance was attached t.o, in order of importance, (1) 
private sources, trade associations, (2) outlook reports from university 
and/or USDA market analysts, (3) recent price patterns with the expecta-
tion the current pattern will continue, and (4) watching seasonal pat-
terns in price and feeding so as to hit the "peak" price. 
The feeders who employ outlook information or price forecasts were 
varied in their response to questions concerning the accuracy of the 
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forecasts. Weighted averages (weighted by frequency of response for 
the various levels) suggest the feeders feel the price forecasts are 
too high 44 percent of the time and too low 40 percent of the time. In 
the majority of the cases, the price forecast employed by the feeders 
"missed" the price which was ultimately realized by from $. 51 to $1.00 
per hundredweight. 
Twenty-two of 32 feeders responding indicated they will allow a 
difference of more than $.50 per hundredweight before they consider 
price forecasts "useless", regardless of whether the market is rising 
or falling. The remaining 10 replies were scattered throughout the 
lower "differences"; three feeders would require the forecasts to miss 
the mark by less than $.10 per hundredweight. 
Product Valuation 
The fifth primary area of interest involves product valuation. 
This area includes such factors as sources of price information, price 
determinants, and operator's ability to estimate various value dimen-
sions of the animals. 
Feeders were asked to name the most important source(s) of price 
information used as they begin to negotiate the sale of a particular 
lot of cattle. Many sources are employed, but according to importance 
as judged by frequency of use, the sources rank as follows: 
1. Yellow sheet quotations; 
2. Prices at terminal markets and other liveweight quotations; 
3. Daily market news from the USDA, Oklahoma Department of 
Agriculture as disseminated by newspapers, radio and tele-
vision; 
4. Sales by others in the local market; and 
5. Other, including telephone, teletype, buyers' quotes, etc. 
Recognizing other factors enter into price negotiations, the 
feeders were asked to rank selected factors which they might be prone 
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to consider. Of the six factors considered, "current reports of price 
levels in the wholesale beef market" and "current quotes of price levels 
in the live cattle market" rank far ahead of the others in importance. 
Employing weighted averages of the rankings, bids from other potential 
buyers ranks a weak third, price paid for the feeder cattle fourth, and 
costs of gain fifth. The sixth factor, the first bid of the buyer if 
made before the feeder mentioned a price, is given little importance. 
The open-end alternative on this particular question was not used. 
The feeders were asked to rank in order of importance selected 
factors which become determinants of the value of a slaughter animal. 
The factors and the ranking of each are shown in Table XIV. As before, 
the rankings are based on weighted averages of the feeders' estimates 
as to relative importance. 
Quality grade and dressing percentage rank ahead of the other 
factors and are awarded about equal importance in terms of weighted 
averages. Seventeen of 41 respondents ranked quality grade first in 
importance with 16 ranking it second. Seventeen of 37 respondents 
ranked dressing percentage first with 11 ranking it second. Apparently, 
there is a tendency to view these two determinants as being most 
important with some ranking grade first and dressing percentage second, 
others reversing this order. Cutability ranks a rather weak third, 
with the weighted average of rankings considerably below grade and 
dressing percentage. However, five of 24 respondents ranked cutability 
first, five others ranked it second. Six of 25 respondents ranked sex 
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of the animal as the most important determinant. Neither of the remain-
ing factors received a ranking by any feeder above third. There was no 
response to the open-end or "write-in" alternative. 
TABLE XIV 
FEEDERS' RANKING OF IMPORTANT DETERMINANTS 
OF THE VALUE OF A SLAUGHTER ANIMAL 
Factor or Determinant Ranking 
Grade of the animal 
(quality grade) • 
Age of the animal. 
Dressing percentage. 
Sex of the animal. 
Live weight. 
Carcass cutability 
(weight of all lean 
cuts as percent of 







In another part of the questionnaire the feeders were asked to com-
pare their ability to estimate three of the value determining factors 
to the ability of the packer-buyer with whom they deal. The operators 
were given the choices of "better, about same, poorer, and don't know". 
The factors covered were dressing percentage, grade (quality grade), and 
carcass cutability. The results are sunnnarized in Table XV. 
TABLE XV 
FEEDERS' COMPARISON OF THEIR OWN AND PACKER 
BUYERS' ABILITY TO ACCURATELY ESTIMATE 
IMPORTANT DETERMINANTS OF THE VALUE 
OF SLAUGHTER CATTLE 
Rating Relative to No. Feeders Choosing 
Ability of the Dressing 
Packer Buyer Grade Percentage Cutability 
Better 7 6 5 
About Same 25 26 16 
Poorer 6 7 13 
Don't Know 2 1 3 j; 
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Feeders feel they have about the same ability as the packer-buyer 
in estimating quality grade and dressing percentage, but rate themselves 
lower as estimators of cutability. Whether the distributions are biased 
relative to actual performance or ability cannot be determined from the 
data available from this survey. 
Checking the feeders' comparisons relative to selected operational 
characteristics, it appears the managers of the larger lots rate their 
ability to estimate grade and dressing percentage relatively higher. 
Only one of the 16 responding feeders with a capacity above 1,000 head 
rated himself "poorer" as an estimator of grade. Only two of 18 
responding feeders of this larger "group" rated themselves poorer in 
estimating dressing percentage. Conversely, seven of 22 of the smaller 
packers chose "poorer" or "don't know" concerning estimation of grade 
and six of these 22 chose these responses concerning estimation of 
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dressing percentage. There was no apparent relationship between capa-
city and expressed ability to estimate cutability. 
Market Performance 
Another area of concern is the feeders' evaluation of how effec-
tively the market performs. All operators have an opinion on how well 
the market in which they deal functions. This opinion reflects directly 
upon their operating procedures as they prepare to cope with the type 
of market each feeder thinks he faces. 
The feeders were asked to select from several statements the one 
which best reflected their opinion on performance of the market in 
which they sold. The statements and ·the frequency of response to each 
are shown in Table XVI. Among the "other" replies was one which indi-
cated the only time poorer cattle are not discounted adequately is 
during periods of rapidly rising prices. 
Overall, only 12 of the feeders expressed a degree of satisfaction 
with the way their market is performing. These 12 feel the premiums 
and discounts are adequate and, apparently, properly allocated. The 
remaining 30 feeders, those who expressed dissatisfaction with perfor-
mance of their market, were asked to indicate "why". The alternatives 
presented these feeders and the frequency with which each was chosen 
are shown in Table XVII. Among the reasons included in the "other" 
category were: (1) adequate premiums are not paid because of the 
volume needs of the packer and his problem with too many price "break-
downs"; (2) packers try to buy all cattle at an average price and hope 
they yield and grade well; and (3) there are no premiums because the 
packer can't sell a premium carcass for any more than an average carcass. 
TABLE XVI 
FEEDERS' OPINIONS ON THE PERFORMANCE OF THE 
MARKET IN WHICH THEY OPERATE 
Statements of Performance 
Cattle are sold at or near an "average" price with 
no real premiums for the better cattle and discounts 
for the poorer cattle. 
The poorer cattle are discounted, but no comparable 
premium is paid for the better cattle. 
Adequate premiums are paid for the better than aver-
age cattle and the poorer ·cattle are discounted by 
an appropriate amount. 









FEEDERS' CHOICE OF REASONS AS TO WHY THE MARKET DOES NOT PAY 
ADEQUATE PREMIUMS, LEVY APPROPRIATE DISCNJNTS 
Reason for Performance 
There is not enough competition between packers to 
force them to pay a premium for the better cattle 
but they can and do discount poorer cattle. 
The packer will pay a premium for cattle which 
appear to be better than average only when he knows 
the feeder to be a "reputation feeder". 
Most feeders prefer to keep the packer guessing on 
how w~ll the cattle will do in terms of yield, car-
cass cutabiiity, etc. 
Many feeders do not really know the value of their 
cattle and this prevents the well-informed feeder 
from getting a premium for his better cattle. 











As an operating goal, cattle feeders attempt to maximize profits. 
Host attempt to maximize returns per head to each lot of cattle they 
-handle as opposed to some selected time period such as a year. Any 
tendency to seek a more stable situation, one which qualify as a satis-
ficing rather than a maximizing goal, is exhibited by the smaller 
feeders with less than 1,000 head capacity. 
: :os t feeders, regardless of size or other or,eratin~ c11arnctcris -
tic:~. are \dllLnr. to trade stahility of net returns for a chance at a 
higher net return. This holds true even ,;-:rhen U!' to one-third of the 
sales ·within a year will be at a loss or a zero net return l)er head. 
:;uclt behavior was not unexpected. However, the pattern of choices 
(fr.om amonp. patterns of returns with varying levels of stability) when 
averar.e yearly net returns uere held constant did produce unexpected 
results. A significant number of the feeders selected the more vari-
able patterns of returns even with the net returns per head constant. 
~· : "' . 
The reasons for such behavior are not clear, but could well indicate 
an affinity for the "high" market or sale -- even if losses are incurred 
at other times within the production and marketing year. 
Reaction to alternative ways of increasinp, the degree pf vertical 
coordination within the beef marketing system varies across the feeders 
survey.ed. In general, the feeders are opposed to packers owning feed-
lots, which amounts to vertical ~ntegration within the system. Simi-· 
larly, most feeders are not interested in :'buying into:: or establishing 
packing facilities. The few who favored such moves are motivated by 
the need to assure a ready market for their cattle or similar reasons. 
Opinions on the acceptability of packers having cattle custom fed in 
lots owned by feeders is different; most of the 42 feeders surveyed 
considered this acceptable. 
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Few feeders forward contract their slaughter cattle. This second 
form of coordinating activity vertically within the beef marketing 
system is not important in Oklahoma. The lack of use cannot be attri-
buted to disagreement on the relative importance attached to various 
contract variables; the feeders surveyed see few problems in this area. 
Some feeders oppose contractual arrangements because they are viewed as 
precluding competition between packers in the buying of slaughter cattle. 
But the more important barrier seems to be the lack of familiarity with 
contractual sales. 
The third facet of the general pattern of "vertical coordination" 
examined is the use of the futures market. Most feeders do not consider 
hedging their feeding operations; the few who would pause to consider 
this possibility require a positive lock-in margin as a necessary pre-
requisite. 
Another use of the futures market, perhaps a serious "misuse" of 
the market, arises in the feeder's cattle buying activities. The major-
ity of the feeders would adjust the price they would be willing to pay 
for feeder cattle up or down when the level at which the relevant dis-
tant futures contract moves up or down. Thus, the feeders use the 
futures market as a predictor of cash price. 
Turning to market procedure, the survey revealed that the majority 
of the feeders interviewed sell on a liveweight basis. Such a method 
of selling entails problems of product valuation, but almost 50 percent 
of the feeders would not make information on dressing percentage, grade, 
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and carcass cutability for previously fed cattle available to the buy-
ing packer. They will make the cattle available for visual inspection, 
but offer no records or more detailed information. 
With the exception of a few of the smaller feeders, no attempt is 
made to adjust production and selling activities in response to market 
outlook. The larger feeders in particular try to operate at capacity 
and do not attempt to "out guess" the market. When negotiations for 
sales a'I'e. then begun, an indication of price levels in the wholesale 
beef market -- primarily the "Yellow Sheet" -- is the most important 
informational source to the feeders. 
,. 
In the area of product valuation, feeders ranked quality grade and 
' ' 
dressing percentage as the important determinants of value. ·The theore-
tically important factor, carcass cutability, ranked a weak third. 
Perhaps related to this ranking, the feeders in general feel they can 
compete with the packer buyer in estimating quality grade and dressing 
percentage, but feel they fall short in ability to estimate carcass 
cutability. There is a tendency for the large feeders to rank them-
selves higher in all areas of estimation as compared to the smaller 
feeders. 
The feeders generally rate the performance of the market within 
which they must operate as "poor". Only a small percentage feel ade-
quate premiums are paid for the more valuable animals or that adequate 
discounts are levied against the less valuable animals. Many of the 
feeders feel a premium will be paid only on "reputation" cattle, if 
at all, which places the valuation on a subjective basis with only 
indirect relation to the actual physical product. 
· .. ~ · .. : 
CHAPTER IV 
PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE PACKER SURVEY RESULTS 
The data from the meat packer survey will be presented in two 
parts: (1) general characteristics of the packing operations; and (2) 
conflicts in goals or operational characteristics within the packing 
sector. Three operational characteristics, namely plant capacity, 
years of plant operation, and prevalence of custom feeding of cattle, 
will be examined on a selective basis for any relationship to isolated 
conflicts internal to the packing sector. 
Organizational Characteristics of the Packing Sector 
Several levels of capacity were covered in the sample (Table 
XVIII). The plants interviewed varied from giant publicly-owned stock 
corporations to small private operations. The five plants in the 
broad 51-500 head category have daily kills of 70, 70, 75, 104 and 
120 head. Thus, there were no plants in the size range between 125 
head per day and the two large firms which kill 700 and 720 head per 
day. 
Most of the plants contacted have been in operation for ten years 
or more (Table XIX). Almost 50 percent of the plants were included in 
the 21-30 years category. Only three of the 23 plants surveyed have 
been in operation for less than ten years. 
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TABLE XVIII 
DISTRIBUTION OF THE SAMPLE PACKING PLANTS 
BY CAPACITY OF OPERATION 
Capacity of Packing Plant 
(Head Slaughtered per Day) 












DISTRIBUTION OF THE SAMPLE PACKING PLANTS 
BY YEARS OF PLANT OPERATION 
of Plant Operation 






The third and final organizational characteristic covered is the 
prevalence of custom feeding by packers. Six of the 23 packers 
surveyed are having cattle fed for them for use in their own plants 
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(Table XX). Three of the six are very small plants (capacity less than 
25 head per day) and three are larger plants (capacity greater then 100 
head per day). The packers which have cattle fed are feeding a rela-
tively small proportion of their total cattle slaughter. No one plant 
has more than 40 percent of slaughter needs custom fed. 
TABLE XX 
PREVALENCE OF CUSTOM FEEDING OF CATTLE BY PACKERS 




Number of Plants 
6 
17 
Operational Characteristics of the Packing Sector 
The questionnaire employed in the packer survey was constructed to 
investigate the "other side" of the areas of conflict investigated in 
the feeder survey. The feeder is the seller and the packer is the 
buyer but interaction between the two is on ground common to both. 
Again, six selected "dimensions" will be considered. 
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Overall Economic Goal of the Operation 
The managers were presented four goals and asked to select the one 
alternative that best describes the goal of their slaughter cattle 
operation. Emphasis was on their cattle buying activities. The goals 
and the packers' selections are summarized in Table XXI. 
TABLE XXI 
NUMBER OF PACKERS SELECTING ALTERNATIVE GOALS 
FOR THEIR SLAUGHTER CATTLE OPERATIONS 
Economic Goal of Operation 
Goal I - Try to minimize the cost per head for 
each animal slaughtered. 
Goal II - Try to operate on a "set" margin per 
head which has been selected as ade-
quate and buy so as to achieve this 
set margin over each year of operation. 
Goal III - Try to buy cattle so as to realize 
some target average margin per head 
above the level you are now achieving. 
Goal IV - Try to buy cattle so as to maximize 
the return or margin per hear over 
each year of operation. 
Goal V - If none of the above fit your case, 
please describe your objective in 
buying. 
Number of Packers 







The responses to the open-end alternative were not revealing, 
reflecting particular sets of circumstances or attitudes on the part of 
the managers. Examples include one packer who says he has little con-
trol over his operation because he is "in the middle between the feeder 
and the central buying concerns", and a second packer who feeds most of 
his cattle to supply a buyer with light-weight dressed carcasses. 
When operating goals are compared with plant capacity, the only 
apparent relationship is a tendency for the larger packers to avoid the 









PACKERS' CHOICE OF OPERATING GOALS 
COMPARED TO PLANT CAPACITY 
No. Packers Choosing by Level of Capacity 
Plant CaEacitI ~Head Eer Dail 
0-20 21-50 51-500 >500 
1 2 0 0 
2 2 0 0 
1 2 3 0 
3 1 2 -1 
1 2 0 1 
There is no apparent relationship between goals selected and the 
number of years the plant has been in operation. When the prevalence 
of custom feeding is compared to goal choices, no apparent relation-
~-sh1ps·are found. 
Attitudes Towards Cost of Cattle and Variability in Supply 
A question was designed as the "mirror image" of the question 
employed in the feeder survey which dealt with feeders' attitudes 
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toward level of returns and variability in returns (Appendix B, question 
IV). Packers were asked to assume they are trying to operate at ninety 
percent of their rated full capacity. They were then asked to select 
~ from five different cost level-supply variability alternatives. 
Each alternative contained two important factors: (1) percentage varia-
tions in the available monthly quantity of cattle above and/or below 
the quantity needed for them to operate at the ninety percent level; 
and (2) the average yearly costs of slaughter cattle, per hundredweight, 
into their plant. Each of the situations covered a twelve month oper-
ating period. Packers were asked to choose the situation they would 
prefer to face if they knew they would face this situation year after 
year (Table XXIII). 
Packers who chose Situation I and II had the same basic reasons 
for their choices: (1) it is most or more stable with respect to 
supply; (2) it is better to have a uniform kill and a small profit than 
none at all; and (3) costs would be more uniform and possibly lower in 
either Situation I or II. Those packers that selected Situation III 
gave the following reasons: (1) to keep both the buyer and seller 








PACKERS' CHOICES FROM AMONG ALTERNATIVE COMBINATIONS OF COST PER CWT. AND 
VARIATION IN THE AVAILABLE NUMBERS OF CATTLE 
Number Yearly Average Monthly Variation Around the Number of Cattle to 
Packers Cost of Cattle Maintain 0Eerations at 90% of Rated CaEaciti 
Choosing ($ per cwt.) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
11 30.20 -2 1 -1 0 -1 -1 1 2 1 -1 0 
4 30.10 -1 2 -3 1 -1 -4 3 1 -1 -2 3 
3 30.00 1 -6 0 -3 5 -1 3 -5 6 -1 1 
0 29.90 0 6 -5 3 -7 3 0 -6 -3 7 3 








problem. Only one packer that chose Situation V gave a reason for 
choosing it. He thought the fluctuation was better for his method of 
operation. 
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To see whether the packers were indeed saying they would pay a 
higher price for a more stable supply of cattle, a "check" question was 
asked at another point in the interview. Average yearly costs were 
held constant at $30.00 per hundredweight but the supply was allowed to 
vary precisely as was the case in Table XXIII (Appendix B, question XII). 
Eighteen of 20 responding packers chose Situation I, the most stable in 
terms of supply variability, and defended their choice as follows: 
(1) Situation I is more stable with respect to supply; (2) costs will be 
less in a situation with low variability in supply;.and (3) planning 
and execution of operations is much easier under stable conditions. 
Situations III and IV were each chosen by one paeker, but no reasons 
for their choice were given. 
There is no obvious relationship between capacity, years in opera-
tion, or involvement in custom feeding of cattle and the packers' 
response to the two questions. In general, the desire for supply stabi-
lity was common to all packers. 
Coordination of Activity 
In order to determine packers attitudes towards alternative ways 
of coordinating marketing activity, they were asked a series of ques-
tions on contracting, futures market operations, and custom feeding of 
cattle. 
Packers were asked if they contract purchase a significant propor-
tion of their slaughter cattle purchases. Five of the 23 packers noted 
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they are doing some contract buying of cattle. The percentage of their 
slaughter contracted generally ranged from 21 to 50 percent. There are 
no apparent relationships between plant capacity, years of plant opera-
tion, or the prevalence of custom feeding and the occurrance and magni-
tude of contract buying. 
Packers were asked to rank in importance selected contract vari-
ables, a "mirror image" question to the one asked feeders and reported 
in Chapter III. Only eight of the 23 packers responded to the question, 
so the base for any conclusions is limited. In attempting to rank the 
replies of the eight, contractual provisions calling for (1) specifying 
the exact time of day for the cattle to be weighed, (2) specifying an 
exact pencil shrink, and (3) specifying the exact price to be paid upon 
delivery were ranked first, second, and third respectively. This 
limited base suggests packers often view other factors to be of equal 
or greater importance than price. None of the responding packers felt 
the feeders with whom they deal would have ranked the variables any 
differently. 
Related, the packers were questioned concerning their opinion as 
to the impact contractual sales of slaughter cattle have on the 
slaughter cattle market. Only 11 of the 23 packers responded to the 
question. The alternatives from which the packers made their selections 
and the number of responses for each are shown in Table XXIV. Among 
the "other" comments was one which noted contracting "hurts the market 
at times." 
Concerning custom feeding of cattle, most packers feed to "take 
up slack" and combat variability in the supply of cattle. Custom 
feeding is appealing to many packers because they are not required to 
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make the large capital outlay which would be required if they constructed 
feedlots of their own. 
TABLE XXIV 
PACKERS' OPINIONS CONCERNING THE EFFECT OF CONTRACTING 
ON THE SLAUGHTER CATTLE MARKET 
Alternatives 
Stabilizes the price at which cattle move by 
decreasing short-run fluctuations in the quantity 
of available cattle. 
Stabilizes as in first alternative and lowers 
the overall price level. 
Stabilizes as in first alternative and raises 
the overall price level. 
Works to the benefit of both packer and feeder 
by establishing better working relationships. 
Has hurt the market in which I buy because too 
many cattle are "tied up" through contracts and 
I have trouble finding cattle. 










A fourth area of importance to the packing sector is that of market 
procedure. In order to study the problems in more detail, packers 
were questioned about several facets of their buying operations where 
problems of inconsistency or conflict are likely to arise. 
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Packers were asked to describe their typical buying procedure in 
terms of the basis on which they buy cattle (Table .. XXV). When choice 
of buying procedure is compared to plant capacity, length of operation, 
and prevalence of custom feeding, no relationships are apparent. 
TABLE XXV 
TYPICAL BUYING PROCEDURE FOLLOWED BY PACKERS IN THE 
PURCHASE OF SLAUGHTER CATTLE 
Typical Buying Procedure Number of Plants 
Buy at least 50 percent on a live-weight 
basis. 
Buy at least 50 percent on a carcass grade 
and weight or other carcass evaluation 
basis. 
Buy 50-50 on a live-weight and carcass 
evaluation basis. 





Packers were next asked whether or not they are dependent primarily 
upon one feeder or feedlot as a source of supply for their slaughter 
cattle. Slightly over thirty percent of the packers interviewed replied 
"yes" to this question. Their reasons can be sununarized by the follow-
ing two statements: (1) "The feedlot I use is a close and convenient 
source of cattle" or (2) "I can obtain the quality of cattle I desire 
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from the feedlot". Several packers said they preferred to feed cattle 
in their own feedlots. 
In another question packers were asked about marketing tactics. 
It was hypothesized that packers changed their buying tactics and that 
feeders change their selling tactics as the supply of cattle varies. 
The packers were asked if they make·any changes in their buying tactics 
when cattle supplies become larger. Sixteen of the 23 packers surveyed 
noted they make some change in tactics. The changes can be summarized 
as follows: (1) the packer is not as aggressive a buyer when supply is 
heavy; (2) he, the packer, takes more time in buying, looks at more 
cattle, and takes advantage of the fact that he has additional sources 
from which to choose; (3) he may require the feeder to deliver the 
cattle to the plant; and (4) he usually buys only what cattle are needed 
for current slaughter levels. In general, packers.feel they have mar-
ket advantages over the feeder when cattle supplies are excessive. 
Packers also believe the feeders change their selling tactics when 
cattle supplies are scarce. Twenty-two of the packers felt that the 
feeders make some changes in this type of situation •.. The changes that 
packers think feeders make can be summarized as follows: (1) the 
feeder can hold his cattle off the market longer; (2) the feeder asks 
a higher price for his cattle when supplies are scarce; (3) the feeder 
has more market sources for his supply; (4) the feeder tries to feed 
a cheaper grade of cattle; or (5) the feeders make the packer come to 
the lot and pick up the cattle~ Most of the packers.surveyed feel the 
market advantage rests with the feeder when cattle supplies are scarce. 
Since supply problems tend to plague packers they were asked about 
the nature of the problems and some possible solutions. One question 
related to the necessity of "bidding up" the price of. cattle during 
periods of short supply. In general, the packers agreed this does 
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occur, noting the four to eight week period in late spring and summer is 
the interval within the year when supplies are typically short. Respond-
ing to a related question, over 50 percent of the packers would pay a 
premium (compared to the "average" yearly price) to. feeders who would 
guarantee a stable supply of cattle during a period of "short supply". 
The packers favor this idea because they feel that ... i.t would be easier 
to market animals of consistent quality in addition to the stability 
it would give to their operations. The packers who.were not willing to 
pay a premium feel they are too small and their operations are too 
variable for satisfactory arrangements with feeders to be worked out. 
The packers who were willing to pay a premium were then questioned 
about the amount they would be willing to pay in order to have feeders 
guarantee to supply a certain percentage of their normal kill. Packers 
were asked to indicate the premium they would be willing to pay feeders 
to supply them 20, 40, 60, 80, or 100 percent of their kill on a sche-
duled basis. The results are summarized in Table XXVI. The packers 
noted that such buying arrangements would eliminate travel expenses 
and time spent in looking for cattle. However, packel:'s do not think 
feeders would be willing to start such a program a.t .the present time 
because they do not think the feeders are willing to "tie-up" their 
cattle. There is also concern among the packers about the feeders' 
ability to meet a guarantee to supply the quality of cattle desired. 
In another "mirror-image" question, the packers' attitudes toward 
a preferred negotiation position were investigated. The problem here 
assumes purchase of cattle on a live-weight basis and concerns the 
amount of information the packer prefers to have before he begins to 
negotiate the purchase of a pen of cattle. The negotiation positions 
and the packers selections are summarized in Table XXVII. 
TABLE XXVI 
PREMIUMS PACKERS WOULD PAY FOR GUARANTEED SUPPLIES OF CATTLE: 
SELECTED PERCENTAGES OF THE NORMAL KILL 
Premium Packers Number Packers Responding by Percent of 
Would Pay Kill to be Guaranteed 
($ per cwt.) 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 
<$.25 1 1 1 
.26-.50 2 4 4 
.51-1.00 1 
1.01-2.00 1 1 1 
>2.00 
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Packers who chose the third negotiation position, involving essen-
tially no transfer of information, defended their choice as follows: 
(1) I want to know only the number of days the cattle were on feed and 
what feed they were fed; (2) I cannot trust the information the feeder 
gives me; or (3) I would rather let the buyer evaluate the cattle since 
this is the job the buyer is being paid to do and I trust his ability 
to judge cattle. The division between positions I and II was based 
primarily upon feelings on how detailed the information could be 
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or needed to be in order to help. Those packers choosing I and II all 
agreed such information was helpful and is the type ~f information 
needed to eliminate "guessing". The several packers who chose the open-
end alternative offered such reasoning as the following: (1) all I 
want to know is the length of time on feed and what feed was fed; (2) 
my buyer is a good judge of cattle and I trust his ability to evaluate 
the cattle accurately; (3) I can not get this type of.information from 
the feeders from whom I purchase cattle; and (4) I do not trust infor-
mation of this type the feeder would give me. 
TABLE XXVII 
PACKERS' PREFERENCE OF A NEGOTIATION POSITION WHEN 
BUYING ON A LIVEWEIGHT BASIS 
Negotiation Position 
I. The feeder has given you access to his 
records providing detailed per head infor-
mation on dressing percentage, carcass 
cut-out percentage, quality, grade, etc. 
for previous cattle he has fed. 
II. The feeder has given you a summary of the 
percent of his cattle which grade choice, 
of average carcass cut-out, and dressing 
percentages of pervious cattle he has· fed. 
III. The feeder makes the cattle available for 
your inspection, but offers no additional 
information. 
IV. None of the above; please explain ----







Packers were then asked if their buying strategy would differ 
according to the amount of information they could obtain on the cattle, 
i.e. which negotiation position they must face. Eleven of 21 packers 
responding replied "yes". The packers seem to be more cautious as they 
approach situations like position III. The strategic adjustments made 
typically involve moves to provide protection against the uncertainty 
relating to factors such as dressing percentage, etc., when this infor-
mation is not provided. Generally, the change is in the form of a 
price adjustment; many of the packers would pay more for the cattle if 
they could obtain the types of information herein discussed. 
In an effort to determine how much monetary importance was attached 
to this information, the packers were asked how much they would discount 
price offered if such information had not been available. As a stand-
ard, the packers were told to assume they had bid $30.00 per cwt. 
(liveweight basis) when complete information on dressing percentage, 
carcass cutability, etc. on previously fed cattle was available (nego-
titation position I in Table XXVII). The replies of those packers who 
responded to this question are shown in Table XXVIII. 
Responding to a related question, seven of the 23 packers noted 
they would expect the feeder to prefer the situation involving com-
plete transfer of information. Two packers felt the feeder would want 
a summary of the pertinent information made available, three felt the 
feeder would prefer to just make the cattle available for inspection, 
and six noted which position the feeder would be likely to choose 
would depend upon the circumstances, whether he had dealt with the 
packer before, etc. Six of the 23 packers declined response to the 
question. 
TABLE XXVIII 
PACKERS' DISCOUNTS FOR UNCERTAINTY WHEN BUYING CATTLE: 
SELECTED NEGOTIATION POSITIONS 
No. Packers Responding by 




Position <.25 .so 1.00 2.00 >2.01 
Summary versus detailed infor-
mation on quality grade, dress-
ing percentage, carcass cut-
ability. 
Cattle available for inspec-






2 2 0 
3 3 2 
The packers, in general, feel inclusion of such information in the 
negotiation proceedings works to the benefit of both packer and feed~r. 
The cattle under consideration can be evaluated more accurately and 
the packer is less prone to provide himself insurance by discounting 
price or exerting influence on other terms of trade. 
Product Valuation 
In order to determine the effectiveness of current indicators of 
value of an animal, packers were asked to indicate their opinions on 
the accuracy with which live animal prices reflect the carcass value of 
an animal. The opinions of 20 packers who responded to the question 
are summarized in Table XXIX. 
The packers were asked to select from several alternative state-
ments why the animals go at an "average" price and, more specifically, 
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why premiums are not paid for the better cattle. Table XXX summarizes 
the alternatives and the selections of the packers. 
TABLE XXIX 
PACKERS' OPINIONS ON THE ACCURACY OF LIVE PRICES IN 
REFLECTING CARCASS VALUE 
Opinions Presented 
Cattle move at an "average" price with no 
significant premiums for the more valuable 
cattle and no significant discounts for the 
less valuable cattle. 
Poorer cattle are effectively discounted, but 
the truly valuable does not receive the pre-
mium it deserves. 
Other; please explain _________ _ 





Of the two packers that selected the "other" choice, one tends to 
feel that he pays too much for the poorer cattle. The other packer 
buys cattle on a hot weight basis and sells on a cold weight basis. 
He does not think the margin is enough to offset cooler shrink. 
As was the case in the cattle feeder survey, and to help provide 
a base for conclusions, packers were asked to rank in order of import-
ance the important value determinants of a slaughter animal. This 
ranking is presented in Table XXXI. 
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TABLE XXX 
PACKERS' OPINIONS WITH RESPECT TO WHY LIVE PRICES DO NOT 
ACCURATELY REFLECT CARCASS VALUE 
Alternative Reasons 
It is difficult to merchandise the more valuable 
carcass at a higher price so we cannot pay a pre-
mium for the live animal. 
The packer sells in a market where specifications 
are strict, but this is one-sided -- there are 
discounts if the beef does not meet specifica-
tions, but no premiums if it exceeds specifica-
tions. 
The typical packer has to have the higher margin 
on the better carcass to offset narrower margins 
or losses on the less valuable carcasses. 
The variability in value of the beef animal is 
accurately and adequately reflected by premiums 
and discounts imposed by the marketing system. 
Other; please explain -----------







Quality grade and dressing percentage were considered by all 
packers (the 23 surveyed) and were ranked first and second respectively. 
Cutability ranked a rather weak ·third both in terms of position of 
importance and consideration -- six of the 23 packers did not consider 
cutability of sufficient importance to give it a ranking. The other 
factors were awarded lesser importance although seven of 18 packers 
considering liveweight ranked it second or first in importance. 
TABLE XXXI 
PACKERS' RANKING OF SELECTED VALUE 
DETERMINANTS OF A SLAUGHTER 




Grade of the animal 1 
(quality grade) 
Dressing percentage 2 
Carcass cutability 3 
Age of the animal 5 




The final "problem" area is that of market performance. By ana-
lyzing the packers' opinions on market performance, a deeper insight 
can be gained into the problems facing the sector. The packers were 
asked to select any number of six statements describing market perform-
ance. The "response pattern" and the statements of performance are 
shown in Table XXXII. 
The packers were also asked what they have done or are considering 
to solve these problems in their own operation. Their answers included 
the following: (1) we are custom feeding cattle; (2) we are building 
our own feedlot; (3) we cut back on the kill and reduce plant operations 
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to a lower level; (4) we try to out-bid the other packers; and (5) we 
have established a "set" price to encourage the feeders to supply better 
cattle on a consistent basis. A small number of packers chose to do 
nothing about the problems or to just try and "live" with them. 
TABLE XXXII 
PACKERS' OPINIONS ON GENERAL MARKET PERFORMANCE 
Statement of Market 
Performance 
Variability in quantity of cattle available is a 
real problem. 
The quantity is available, but we have problems 
getting the quality we need. 
We find we have to pay a price above the "going 
market price" to insure a consistent number of 
cattle of the quality we need. 
Because of fixed costs, labor commitments, etc., 
we have to "bid-up" prices to excessive levels 
during periods of short supply. 
Competition is such that during periods of short 
supply, we cannot get ~attle even by bidding up 
prices since other packers do the same thing. 
We experience no important problems in getting 
a consistent number of cattle at the quality 
level we need. 










As an operatinp ~oal, meat packers try to maximize returns for an 
opera tinj~ year. Packers view supply and price variability as a 
"problem·; and are Pilling to pay a higher in-plant cost to insure 
stability. 
In relation to methods of coordinating market activity, packers' 
attitudes vary. Very little contract buying is done in the state. 
l.u: tom feeding is, to the packers, an appealing way to combat supply 
variability. ~~rketing agree~ents with existing feeders are preferred 
to integrating into feeding. 
Nark.et procedure used by packers varies with cattle supply levels. 
With larper sunplies, the packer buys less aggressively and with scarce 
supplies is forced to ::bid-up" price. Packers feel that bargaining 
advantage shifts from packer to feeder as cattle supplies vary from 
heavy to light. 
·Most packers prefer a negotiation position in which they obtain as 
much information as possible about the cattle. Significant discounts 
in prices offered to feeders are used to offset the lack of information 
on dressing percentage, etc. on previously fed cattle. 
Packers feel quality grade and dressing percentages are most 
important: cutability ranked a weak third. Packers feel they cannot 
pay a premium for higher cutting carcasses due to merchandising 
problems. In general packers feel market performance is poor. The 
lac~ of a system of adequate premiums or discounts as a price incentive 
to producers reflects this feeling. 
CHAPTER V 
ANALYSIS OF INTERLEVEL CONFLICTS AND OPERATIONAL 
INCONSISTENCIES IN THE FEEDER-PACKER SUBSECTOR 
No effort has been made to analyze the problems of conflict and 
inconsistency as they relate to the combined feeder-packer sector. The 
two levels have been treated separately with only indirect reference 
to interrelations which prevail. The two levels of activity will now 
be combined and treated as a subsector of the beef _marketing system. 
Identifiable conflicts and inconsistencies between the two levels will 
be examined in terms of implications to operational efficiency, the 
degree of in~rlevel coordination attained in the feeder-packer sub-
sector, and possible impact on future organizational structures. 
Selected Conflicts and Inconsistencies 
Important dimensions of performance at the feeder and packer levels, 
the potential sources of conflict and inconsistency, have been identi-
fied in Chapters III and IV. Upon this base, and drawing upon the 
treatment in Chapters III and IV, the extent of conflict and inconsis-. 
tency between the two levels will now be examined. 
Overall Goal of the Operation 
The majority of tqe feeders, especially the larger ones, attempt 
to maximize returns per head for each lot of cattle sold. Conversely, 
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most packers try to maximize the return or margin per head over each 
year of operation. Thus, "maximize returns" is the overall economic 
goal of both feeder and packer, but the planning horizon is different. 
The difference in planning horizons becomes a determinant of the 
realized level of coordination between the feeding and packing levels. 
In pursuing a goal of maximum returns per head for each lot of cattle, 
the feeder perpetuates -- and possibly accentuates -- short run price 
variability in the live cattle market. Such an approach is not con-
ducive to stable price levels and related stable flows of cattle into 
the packing facilities. It appears that packers, by their choice of a 
longer planning horizon, are expressing a desire for increased 
stability. 
Possible implications of this inconsistency (in the length of the 
planning horizon) are manyfold. To the extent that coordination of 
activity between the two levels has been precluded, pressures for change 
in organizational structure have been strengthened. Vertical integra-
tion between two levels of activity such as cattle feeding and meat 
packing provides for, or permits, coordination through ownership and 
the degree of control which goes with ownership. When coordination is 
not achieved through the exchange process with separate ownership at 
the two levels, the pressures for a vertically integrated structure are 
especially strong. 
In similar fashion, the goal conflict serves as an obstacle to 
means of achieving coordination via means less extreme than vertical 
integration -- such as contractual_ arrangements. Most contractual 
arrangements bring with them forward pricing schemes and a degree of 
specificity in price often inconsistent with the feeder's attempt to 
maximize returns per head on each lot of cattle. 
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It should be noted that the possible inconsistency in basic goals 
may contribute significantly to other interlevel conflicts and incon-
sistencies. Thus, examining the other conflicts and/or inconsistencies 
will, in a sense, be continuing to probe the implications of the incon-
sistent goals. 
Attitude Toward Level Versus Variability in Returns (Costs) 
Some inconsistencies existed within the feedlot sector concerning 
the "trade off" between level of returns and variability in returns. 
There is a general consensus that, when net returns are variable, stabi-
lity in returns will be sacrificed for the chance to earn a higher 
level of net returns. However, a significant number of the feeders 
prefer the more variable pattern of returns even when net returns per 
head are held constant over a specified period of time. Packers, on 
the other hand, are interested in stability of operations and appear 
to be willing to pay for increased stability. The majority of the 
packers would be willing to incur a significantly higher in-plant cost 
(per head) to increase stability in the flow of cattle into the plant. 
Relating to coordination between the feeding and packing levels, 
there is definitely a conflict between the two levels concerning this 
area of stability versus level of returns or costs. The feedlot sector 
does not place the same importance on stability of operations. Vari-
ability in the supply of feeder cattle, evolving a fluctuating price 
and related problems in buying, creates difficulty for the feeder. 
However, there is either no transfer of this awareness to the problems 
confronting the packer when the flow of fat cattle is variable or the 
feeder prefers to operate under such conditions. Consequently, there 
has been little effort made by the feeders to explore the possibility 
that increased stability in the flow of cattle -- in quantity and 
quality -- could be mutually beneficial to both parties. 
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The results of the surveys clearly imply packers would pay for 
increased stability -- if the operating environment were such that the 
needed stability were realized and feeders recognized its importance. 
But such is not the case. Rather, the pattern is one of operational 
procedures which largely ignore the interrelations between the two 
levels. Clearly, there is little or no recognition of any need to 
effect and maintain a high degree of coordination between the two 
levels. 
The implications of this particular type of conflict or inconsis-
tency are numerous, spanning several different planning horizons. The 
survey results indicate packers attach a great deal of significance to 
the instability in cattle flows to which they are exposed. This sub-
stantiates efforts in the received literature which establish the eco-
nomic implications of short-run fluctuations in cattle numbers. Over 
the long-run, the pressures from problems associated with fluctuating 
cattle numbers will effect changes in the organizational structure of 
the feeding-packing subsector. Pressures for the packer to integrate 
vertically will develop or be maintained as the packer seeks to impose 
a degree of stability the exchange system has not provided. 
Short-run implications include variable incomes to feeders and 
variable net operating margins to the packer. Per unit costs at the 
packer level are increased. Short-run variations in cattle numbers 
• 
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mean periodic excess supply, a more flexible plant layout (in terms of 
level of operation), and higher procurement costs than would otherwise 
be necessary. Price signals are concealed by a fluctuating price level 
for live cattle and production adjustments are thereby slowed. 
Coordination of Market Activity 
As in the section on variability, views on coordination at each 
level are varied. Both feeders and packers agree that vertical coor-
dination is essential to efficient market operation, but they are not 
in agreement on how such coordination should be accomplished. Gener-
ally, feedlot managers are opposed to means of coordination which 
erodes their complete control of the feeding operations. Differing 
degrees of "control" are met with varying opinions. Methods of coor-
dination that allow the least control or interference by the packing 
sector or other "outside groups" are more compatible to the feeders. 
The packers are not enthusiastic about taking over the feedlot 
sector or becoming feeders themselves. Most packers give the impres-
sion they would prefer to work out agreements with the feeders on a 
custom basis rather than invest in feeding facilities. It appears 
packers are saying they will consider integrating vertically into 
feeding if the "looser" forms of coordination, such as custom feeding 
or contract selling of the cattle, do not supply the needed coor-
dination. 
As implied, the majority of packers and feeders are in. favor of 
custom feeding. Custom feeding does not require the packer to tie up 
his capital in feeding facilities, yet it gives stability to his opera-
tions. The feeder manages his operation with the freedom and 
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independence he values so highly. According to the .-survey. slightly 
over one-fourth of the packers interviewed owned cattle being fed in a 
custom lot. This does not necessarily include cattle being fed for 
employees of packers, affiliated agencies, non-reporting subsidiaries, 
etc. Given the attitudes of feeders and packers, custom feeding by 
packers is likely to increase. 
The other method of coordination that shows potential as a coordi-
nating device is the contract selling of fed cattle. Feeders and 
packers hold generally favorable attitudes towards contracts, but little 
or no contracting is being done by the feeders and packers interviewed. 
The reasons for the lack of use are not clear. Response to the ques-
tions concerning the relative importance of contract variables revealed 
no substantial differences. In general, feeders and packers attach the 
same relative importance to the variables which require specification 
in the contract. 
Accordingly, there are other reasons for not using contracts. 
Insofar as the surveys are concerned, there were two possible reasons 
which could be inferred: (1) the feeder has an aversion to "ty~ng up" 
his cattle and not being free to negotiate sales at or near the time 
of shipment, and related (2) the feeder is afraid he will get caught 
with a contractual price which is lower than the going market price at 
time of delivery. Few feeders, as will be noted later, are in a posi-
tion to protect against this latter possibility by effectively using 
the futures market for live cattle to hedge their position. 
Considerable change in the attitudes and understanding of the 
parties involved, especially the feeder, will be required before con-
tractual sales of fat cattle becomes widespread in Oklahoma. There is 
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some evidence that the packer is willing to offer sufficient economic 
incentive to make contracting an attractive alternative to the feeder, 
especially if stability in cattle flows is realized. 
The survey findings on the use of live cattle futures were sur-
prising in at least two respects: (1) little or no hedging is being 
done, and (2) the futures market -- when used as a part of the feedlot 
manager's decision processes -- is misused. Each of these findings 
will be considered briefly. 
Most feeders indicated they do not consider hedging their feeding 
operation, citing various reasons with lack of understanding of the 
hedging procedure coming up most often. Similarly, most packers indi-
cated a lack of interest in hedging; the one exception was a packer 
who is actively promoting cash contracts for fat cattle. This packer 
then hedges his position. 
Whether lack of understanding or the related technical difficulties, 
arising from the adjustments that have to be made to hedge an Oklahoma 
operation, is the primary reason little hedging is done is not known. 
It is clear the futures market will contribute little to increased 
coordination between the feeding and packing sectors until the barriers 
to its use, real or imaginary, are removed. 
Feeders do use the futures quotes as a predictor of cash prices, 
and this is a misuse of the live cattle futures market. As noted in 
Chapter III, many of the feeders surveyed change the price they are 
willing to pay for feeder cattle as the current quotes on distant 
futures contracts change. If the price of the futures contract goes 
up, the price the feeder will pay for feeder cattle goes up; if the 
price of the futures contract goes down, the feeder will not go as high 
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on his bids for feeder cattle. This constitutes a misuse of the futures 
market. To provide effective hedging alternatives, the futures market 
does not have to be an accurate predictor of cash price. If the cash 
and futures markets converge on or about the maturity date of the 
futures contract, this is all that is required for effective hedging 
of feeding operations. 
The use of the futures market is in its infancy in Oklahoma. Any 
contributions the live cattle futures market can make toward increased 
coordination between the feeding and packing sectors will not be 
realized until understanding of the market and how it can be used is 
materially increased. 
Market Procedure 
Most market transactions between the feedlot and meat packing 
sectors in Oklahoma are on a liveweight basis. The larger feeders i~ 
particular are prone to favor selling on a liveweight basis. Thirteen 
of the 42 feeders interviewed sell predominantly on a carcass basis, 
but most of these have lots of less than 5,000 capacity. Ideally, 
whatever the method employed, the market operates in such a manner that 
both buyer and seller achieve desired results through a standardized 
operating procedure. This standardized procedure, with some adjustment 
to fit individual operations, would then result in economical inter-
level activity and promote coordination between the feeding and pack-
ing levels. However, no standardized mar~et procedur~ is found when 
we examine the present situation. 
Buying tactics in the packing sector tend to vary with levels of 
fed cattle supply. Buyers are more aggressive when supplies are light 
90 
and more selective when supplies are heavy. Survey results indicated 
most packers feel they hold some market advantage over feeders when 
supplies are large by being able to practice selective buying. However, 
the packers feel the tables are turned when supplies are light and the 
packer must bid aggressively to meet his slaughter needs. Most packers 
agreed that the feeder has the advantage by being able to hold back the 
cattle and raise the asking price. The packer feels he has no alterna-
tive but to "bid up" the price. This highly variable procedure is the 
rule and, of course, not conducive to stability of operation at any 
level. 
Attitudes towards using premiums and discounts as a tool in pro-
moting increased stability and coordination were mixed. Most feeders 
do not sell on a premium or discount basis, but the idea was met with 
favorable reception for the most part. The packers appear to be 
willing to set up a system of premiums and discounts in an attempt to 
decrease supply variability. If a feeder (or feeders) would guarantee 
from 60 to 100 percent of the packer's normal kill on a scheduled basis 
into the plant, about one-third of the packers surveyed would pay a 
premium of up to $.SO per hundredweight. A few would go to $1.00 per 
hundredweight or higher. However, the packers doubt that the feeders 
will be willing to commit their cattle under such a program. 
An important part of overall procedure is the negotiation position 
each party -- buyer and seller -- attempts to establish. As noted in 
Chapter III, 21 of 39 feeders responding to the question are willing 
to provide the packer with information on dressing percentage, carcass 
yield, and such information on previously fed cattle. The remaining 
18 prefer to operate from a position where they make the cattle 
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available for inspection but offer no additional information. Interest-
ingly, not all packers want such information. Some indicated they 
would place little faith in information offered by the feeders. 
The conflict in this aspect of procedure is very real and import-
ant. The negotiating arena is too often viewed as a battleground. Not 
all of the participants are willing to provide the information needed 
to help "pin down" the true value of a lot of cattle; even fewer 
actually provide such information. The end result of the conflict is 
a price which may or may not reflect actuar··value ·being paid ·for 
cattle, which may or may not be what the packer thinks he is buying. 
Product Valuation 
Another potential problem area facing the feeder-packer sector 
evolves from conflicting orientations and/or methods in establishing 
the value of the product. Conceptually, the valuation of a product at 
one level is an accurate measure of the product's value to the buyer 
and a means of adequately rewarding the seller. As the product is pro-
cessed and passed through the marketing channels to the final consumer, 
the value added at each stage in processing is reflected as increments 
to price. Product value, as expressed in the form of price or price 
differentials, serves as a guide to production and production-related 
activities. 
The feeding and packing industry has at its disposal a system of 
grades to aid in the valuation of the product they handle. The two 
sectors estimate the value of the 4nimals using the same terminology. 
However, there are differences in interpretation of these terms and the 
relative importance placed on individual terms. 
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The surveys revealed no highly significant inconsistencies between 
feeder and packer in selecting the value determinants of the slaughter 
animal (sold on a liveweight basis). In Chapter III, it was noted 
feeders ranked quality grade and dressing percentage of equal import-
ance, with carcass cutability a rather weak third. The packers, as was 
noted in Chapter IV, largely agreed with the feeders: the ranking on 
quality grade, dressing percentage, and carcass cutability was first, 
second, and third respectively. Again, carcass cutability was a rather 
weak third. The other variables listed, such as sex, age, and live-
weight were given secondary or no importance by both groups. 
While no marked inconsistencies exist, the reasoning for the rela-
tively low ranking of carcass cutability (low relative to its concep-
tual importance) by the two groups is revealing. Most of the feeders 
were not very familiar with the notion of carcass cutability, even 
when it was explained in terms of yield grades or other terminology 
with which the feeder might have been more familiar. While the 
feeders in general feel they are able to "measure up'' against the 
packer buyer in estimating quality grade and dressing percentage, they 
consider themselves inferior to the packer buyer in estimating carcass 
cutability. In general, the feeder is not as yet equipped to use car-
cass cutability as an important value determinant, nor is he inclined 
to do so. 
Packers were generally more familiar with the concept and more 
confident in the ability of their buyers, but carcass cutability was 
ranked low for yet another reason. At least part of the packers feel 
a carcass with greater than average cutability can not be effectively 
merchandised as such -- it is sold in the same market, often at the 
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same price, as all 0th.er carcasses. The extent to which this is due to 
poorly conceived or inadequate merchandising efforts was not determined. 
Overall, the degree of conflict and/or inconsistency between the 
feeder and packer in the importance attached to various variables as 
determinants of value is not highly significant. Carcass cutability 
is not being used extensively nor is it given the importance one might 
expect based on theoretical considerations. With the feeder, the prob-
lem appears to be one of unfamiliarity and lack of understanding; with 
the packer, it is more nearly a felt difficulty in effectively mer-
chandising carcasses with varying cutability levels, The problems 
associated with the inconsistency which does prevail will likely require 
a change in orientation and operational procedure throughout the beef 
marketing system, not just in the packer-feeder subsector. 
Market Performance 
This last area of conflict in the feeder-packer sector is possibly 
the most important and the most difficult to summarize. The. 
greatest influence of the largely unpredictable human or management 
factor is felt here. 
In an ideal situation, the marketing system performs in such a 
manner that the functions are carried on in a coordinated and orderly 
manner. There are no bottlenecks or lags and the product flows 
smoothly through market channels from producer to final consumer. In 
reality, this may be more of a goal to move toward rather than a level 
of expected achievement. 
Most managers of feedlots and packing plants have settled opinions 
of how they think the market in which they operate performs or "treats" 
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them. Operating policies and resulting action of the firm are based on 
these opinions. If the manager feels that the market is treating him 
fairly and rewarding him justly, he will probably deal with others in a 
similar manner. On the other hand, if the manager feels that the mar-
ket is not treating him fairly, he will operate his business in a 
manner that reflects these feelings. 
General implications can be drawn here. Under the system that is 
performing fairly, an attitude of cooperation and coordination can be 
established and will grow. Both sectors recognize that it is to their 
mutual benefit to operate in this manner. In the second case, this is 
not true. With a strong spirit of independent action, cooperation and 
coordination usually do not exist. How the various managers view the 
performance, the adequacy, of the marketing system within which they 
operate is therefore extremely important. 
Market performance, as the term is used in this study, clearly 
has different connotations to each sector. For the feeding sector, 
market performance refers to prices received for slaughter cattle. As 
noted in Chapter III, only 12 of 42 responding feeders feel "adequate 
premiums are paid for the better than average cattle and the poorer 
cattle are discounted by an appropriate amount". Most of the feeders 
feel all cattle moved at an "average" price; others feel discounts are 
levied for "poor" cattle but no premiums are paid for the "better" 
cattle. Overall, then, the feeders label performance of their market 
as "poor" in terms of its capacity to reflect "true" value of the 
animal sold on a liveweight basis. 
The packers generally agreed, noting cattle either move at an 
"average" price or a pattern involving discounts for the "poor" cattle 
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and no premiums for the "better" cattle tends to evolve. When queried 
as to why such a situation prevails, the packers noted the difficulty 
in merchandising the "better" carcasses at .an appropriately higher 
price. Consequently, the packer does not feel.he could or should pay 
the producer a premium for the more valuable live animal. Also noted 
was the market situation confronting the packer, a situation involving 
strict specifications with discounts for.failure to comply -- and often 
no premium if the specifications are exceeded. 
What we have seen is the view of both feeder and packer on the 
dimension of performance important to the feeder and why the observed 
pattern of performance prevails. Whether these problems, involving the 
failure of the system to evolve an adequate set of premiums and dis-
counts -- an adequate set of price signals -- can be solved by adjust-
ment completely within the feeder-packer subsector is not known. It 
depends on whether the "problem" confronting the packers is exogenous 
to the subsector or whether it is due to ineffective merchandising. 
A second and related dimension of market performance is important 
to the packer. Variation in the flow of cattle into their plant, in 
terms of both quantity and quality, is important to the packer. In 
Chapter IV, the reaction of the packers to questions in this area was 
discussed. In general, the packer must operate at all times because 
of his relatively high ratio of fixed to variable costs. When the 
supply of cattle is periodically "short" the packer is forced to bid 
up price -- which may or may not get him more cattle since other 
packers are doing the same thing. 
The conflicts and problems which are inherent to the noted atti-
tudes toward performance of the market are characteristic of the 
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liveweight method of selling. The feeder is concerned that the pricing 
mechanism does not accurately value the animal; the packer largely 
agrees, but is more concerned about the variability in supply with 
which he is confronted. Conceptually, a move to carcass grade and 
weight techniques of selling would improve the situation for both par-
ties. But other attitudes, other conflicts and inconsistencies which 
are prevalent in the feeder-packer subsector, largely preclude a pro-
nounced move to selling on a carcass evaluation basis -- at least in 
the immediate future. 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The working hypothesis underlying this study can be stated as 
follows: There exist goal conflicts and operational inconsistencies 
between cattle feeders and meat packers which block the realization of 
a higher level of interlevel coordination within the feeder-packer sub-
sector of the beef marketing system. The overall objective revolved, 
therefore, around an attempt to isolate such conflicts and/or inconsis-
tencies and establish their relationship with the realized level of 
coordination within the feeder-packer subsector. 
Surveys were conducted at the feeder and packer levels in Oklahoma. 
Questionnaires were developed which explored activities of feeders and 
packers along selected dimensions of the total connection between the 
two levels. The questions were like a "mirror image" in that the same 
topics were covered, but for buyer and seller respectively. Selection 
of each of the "dimensions" was equivalent to hypothesizing that signi-
ficant problems of conflict and/or consistency prevailed along the 
dimension identified. Each of these dimensions or areas will be dis-
cussed briefly with emphasis on the conclusions emerging from the ana-
lysis and the implications of these conclusions. 
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Overall Economic Goal 
Both packer and feeder are motivated primarily by a desire to 
maximize profits. However, the typical feeder seeks to maximize net 
returns to each lot of cattle sold; the typical packer seeks to maxi-
mize returns to his operation over a longer planning horizon, such as 
a year. 
98 
The difference in planning horizons exerts significant influence 
on the pattern of interaction between the packer and feeder. The 
feeder's goal of maximizing net returns to each lot of cattle tends to 
permit or accentuate short-run fluctuations in price, discourages con-
tractual or related forward pricing schemes, and becomes an obstacle to 
attempts to effect a higher degree of stability -- price and quantity --
in the live cattle market. The packer is more concerned with stability, 
emphasizing a longer planning horizon. 
More information is needed on how the expressed goals of the 
feeder and packer respectively are transformed into operational pro-
cedures. Such will prove necessary to "pin down" more specifically 
the economic implications of the apparent inconsistency in goals and 
provide a basis for corrective action. 
Level vs. Variability in Returns or Costs 
Feeders prefer the more variable pattern of returns when average 
net returns over time (an operating year) increase with the variability. 
This holds true even when losses are incurred periodically. However, 
some feeders still prefer the more variable patterns with average net 
returns held constant. This suggests importance is attached to the 
periodic "high" sales which go with the more variable sales patterns. 
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Packers prefer more stability. Most are willing to incur a higher 
in-plant cost to achieve a degree of stability in the numbers of cattle 
flowing into their plants. 
Implications of this type of inconsistency are apparent. The 
packer's cost structure is higher due to short~run fluctuation in live 
cattle numbers and prices. Price signals are concealed by price 
fluctuations. Motivations for packers to integrate vertically into 
feeding are perpetuated and strengthened since the desired degree of 
stability is not being realized via an open market exchange system. 
Any realization that increased coordination might-be mutually 
beneficial to both feeder and packer is missing. Work is needed to 
illustrate the changes which would accrue from increased coordination; 
simulation techniques should be investigated as a possible methodology 
to evolve such illustrations. 
Coordination of Market Activity 
Feeders are strongly opposed to vertical integration (from packing 
back into feeding) as a means of achieving vertically coordinated mar-
ket activity. Attitudes toward custom feeding by packers in feeder-
owned lots are more lenient. In general, the packers agree; it appears 
they view vertical integration as a last resort if other means of 
effecting coordination and related stability of operation fail. 
Both groups view contractual sales (of fat cattle) as a permiss-
able course of action, but little contracting is being done. There is 
surprising agreement between the two groups concerning the relative 
importance of variables to be specified in the contract. Lack of 
familiarity with contractual arrangements, the feeder's hesitancy to 
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commit himself, and some feeling by feeders that contractual arrange-
ments preclude strong competition between packers in bidding for cattle 
appear to be the barriers to contractual selling of slaughter cattle. 
The live cattle futures market is not effectively used by either 
feeders or packers. Lack of understanding precludes the feeder using 
the futures market to hedge his position in contractual selling of 
slaughter cattle. Few feeders consider hedging their feeding operation. 
Only the larger packers consider the futures market as a means of 
hedging contractual arrangements in buying. When considered by the 
feeders, the futures market is misused; the price feeders are willing 
to pay for feeder cattle is based to a significant extent on the pre-
vailing quotes for distant live cattle futures contracts. 
Many of the barriers to moving to alternative ways of achieving 
"market coordination" in the feeder-packer subsector are the result of 
lack of understanding. There is conflict between the two groups con-
cerning the desirability of vertical integration by the packer and 
some difference of opinion concerning the implications of contractual 
selling of slaughter cattle. But the more important barrier is ignor-
ance. In most cases, there is little insight concerning the potential 
implications of using such techniques as a contract for delivery of 
cattle on a specific date, at a specific price, with the position of 
each party to the transaction hedged using the live cattle futures 
market. Efforts to generate the possible outcomes of alternative 
courses of action and to convey this information to those actively 
engaged in buying and selling of slaughter cattle are needed. 
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Market Procedure 
Most cattle are sold on a liveweight-basis. Packers discount the 
price on cattle where little or no information is available to facili-
tate "accurate" estimates of dressing percentage, quality grade, and 
carcass cutability. Yet, one-half of the feeders surveyed are not 
willing to provide such information on previously fed cattle. Not all 
packers want such information, voicing questions about its accuracy or 
about the ability of the feeder to provide the information. 
The negotiation table is often viewed as a battleground. Many 
feeders are not willing to transmit information to help "pin down" the 
value of cattle when sold on a liveweight-ba~is; some packers would not 
t.cus t the information if given. Such behavior perpetuates the tendency 
for cattle to be sold at an "average" price without benefit of premiums 
or discounts based on the actual value of the carcass at retail. The 
communication effectiveness of the marketing system is thereby 
decreased and legitimate production adjustments slowed. 
Needed are measurements of the implications of such conflicts on 
the level and pattern of returns to feeders, in both the short-run and 
over the long-run, and on costs to the packers which evolve directly 
from the need to "guess" at value. At a more conceptual level, the 
implications of such market procedure to efficiency of the system 
need to be explored. Such would encourage consideration of procedures 
alternative to liveweight selling, such as various carcass evaluation 
techniques, which are theoretically superior but currently in disfavor 
with most feeders. 
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Product Valuation 
Both feeders and packers selected quality grade and dressing per-
centage as the important determinants of value of the· live beef animal. 
The theoretically important carcass cutability factor was ranked a weak 
third by both groups. Feeders feel they equal the packer buyer in 
ability to estimate quality grade and dressing percentage, but not car-
cass cutabili ty. This partially explains the low ranking given "car-
cass cutability." 
The packers' low ranking was due in part to problems in merchan-
dising beef carcasses at prices consistent with the "carcass cutability" 
variable. This has implications to both groups. If the packer is 
unable to merchandise the "high cutting" carcass at· a premium, then he 
refuses to pay a premium for the more valuable animal. Thus, feeders 
feel they are not paid premiums for the more valuable animal and 
packers insist they cannot pay more when they cannot sell for more. 
Implications of this "conflict" are far-reaching. Whether .the 
situation arises from outside the packer-feeder subsector or is due to 
ineffective merchandising by the packers is not known. Badly needed 
are efforts to pinpoint the bottlenecks in the beef marketing system, 
the connections which block the transmission of an effective set of 
premiums and discounts. More work is needed to· determine the extent 
to which a "bottleneck" exists within the packer-feeder subsector. 
Market Performance 
Feeders generally rank the performan·ce of the· market· .as "-poor"; 
premiums are not paid when deserved and discounts ·are not levied when 
a discount is appropriate. This is the attribute of performance which 
is important to the feeder because it is directly connected to the 
price he receives. 
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The packers agree with the feeders, but consider another dimension 
of performance more important to their operation. The market does not 
provide the stable flow of cattle, at a consistent quality, which the 
packer deems desirable. They, too, rank performance of the market as 
"poor". 
Market performance is, of course, a catchall for the other dimen-
sions which have been identified. Reaction of the feeders and packers 
in this area provides testimony to the importance of the conflicts and 
inconsistencies identified. No specific "needs" can be listed here, 
but a general observation is in order. Increased awareness of the 
relationship between the behavioral inconsistencies over which they 
have a degree of direct control and the performance of the market which 
they label as "poor" is needed by both feeder and packer. Such aware-
ness may well be a necessary condition for any improvements initiated 
internally to the subsector. 
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OKLAHOMA FEEDLOT SURVEY 
Code: ---
I. General information. Please answer as indicated: 
1. (One-time capacity, not what you 
head. 
Capacity of your lot. 
could feed yearly) ---
2. Characteristics of the manager: 
a. Age: 
b. Years of experience in feeding: 
c. Manager: ___ Owner-Manager: (mark one) 
d. How long has your feedlot been in operation? 
Years: ___ Months: 
e • How long have you been manager? 
Years: ___ Months: 
3. Characteristics of the feedlot operation: 
a. Percent of your feeding which is on a custom basis % 
b. Percent equity in the business. (Please mark the cate-
gory below which shows the percent of the business which 







---- 25-49 percent 
---- 0-24 percent 
4. Attitude toward the structure or pattern of ownership in 
cattle feeding: 
a. Do you feel packers should be allowed to own feedlots? 





b. Do you feel packers should be allowed to feed cattle in 
lots owned by others? ___ Yes ___ No 
c. Are you currently, or have you ever, considered "buying 
into" a packing or slaughtering operation? 
___ Yes ___ No 
Why or why not? 
d. If you are at least part owner in the lot which you man-
age, would you consider allowing a packer to "buy into" 
your operation and become part owner? 
___ Yes ___ No 
Why or why not? 
s. Typical selling procedure: 
Sell at least 50 percent on liveweight basis. 
--- Sell at least 50 percent on carcass grade and weight or other carcass evaluation basis. 
--- Sell 50-50 on liveweight and carcass basis. 
Which one of the following best describes the objectives or goals 
of your operation? 
Try to maximize the return per head for each lot of cattle 
you handle. 
Try to maximize the returns to your total operation over 
some specific period of time (such as each year of opera-
tion). 
Try to realize some chosen rate of return on your invest-
--- ment (which may be expressed in terms of percent return 
or margin per head). 
Seek some stable or constant return which you-have decided 
is acceptable for your particular operation. 
If none of the above fit your case, please describe your 
goals or objectives: 
III. Concerning selling procedure, please answer the following: 
1. What source of price information is most important to you as 
you begin to negotiate the sale of a particular lot of 
cattle? 
2. Please rate your ability to estimate the factors below as 
compared to the ability of the packer buyers with whom you 
deal: 




b. Dressing percentage: 
Better ---
About Same ---









3. If you sell cattle on the basis that a certain percentage 
must grade Choice, please answer the following: 
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a. Is there a certain premium or discount agreed upon if 
the percentage which make Choice goes above (premium) or 
below (discount) the set percentage? ___ Yes ___ No 
If yes, then mark the correct procedure below: 
---
The premiums and discounts are the same on a per 
cwt. basis. 
The discounts are larger than the premiums. 
The premiums are larger than the discounts. 
IV. If you are selling cattle on a liveweight basis, which of the 
following situations would you prefer the buyer be in as you. 
begin negotiations? 
The packer has access to your records providing informa-
tion on dressing percentage, carcass cut-out·percentage 
(yield grade), quality grade, etc. for previous cattle 
you have fed. 
___ You have given the packer a summary of the percent of your 
cattle which grade Choice (and Good, Prime, etc.), of 
average dressing percentages, and average carcass cut-out 
percentage (yield grade) for previous cattle you have fed. 
___ You make the cattle available to the packer-buyer for his 
inspection but offer no additional information. 
Why did you choose the particular situation which you marked? 
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V. Below are several questions or statements concerning the market 
in which you operate. Please answer as requested: 
1. Indicate the number of buyers from whom you normally receive 
bids on your cattle. 
2. Do you supply most of the cattle bought by any particular 
packer? ___ Yes ___ No 
3. Do you make a decision on how many cattle to feed based on 
the market outlook? 
No, keep the lot "full" at all times. Why do you 
operate in this manner? _______________ _ 
Yes. If yes, you apparently use some procedure of 
forecasting price levels. Please rank in order of 
importance (1st, 2nd, etc.) those of the following 
which would fit the method you use in deciding on out-
look for price for slaughter cattle. 
Private sources, trade associations. ---
___ Current quotes on live cattle futures contracts 
for several months in the future. 
___ Outlook reports from university and/or USDA mar-
ket analysts. 
___ Note what price has been doing (rising, falling, 
or steady) for past few months and plan on this 
to continue for the next few months when cattle 
would be ready for the market. 
___ Expect price of beef to move upward since it has 
generally been increasing in recent years. 
___ Watch how prices typically vary within the year 
and make plans to put cattle in the lot so they 
will be "finished" during the season when prices 
are typically best. 
___ Watch the cyclical movement in prices and plan 
to feed more cattle during the upswing of the 
cycle. 
___ Other, please explain: 
4. If yes, over what time period or periods would it be most 
useful for the cattle you sell? --------------
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5. We realize that there are no price forecasting procedures 
that allow price prediction with 100 percent accuracy. Over 
time, estimated prices will usually be above or below the 
actual prices received. On the basis of your past experience 
with price forecasting, what percentage of the time is your 
estimate of the price you expect to receive for your cattle 
above or below the price you actually receive? 
a. Percentage of the time estimated price is above actual 
price received: 
b. Percentage of the time estimated price is below actual 
price received: 
c. By what amount per cwt. is the estimate most often 
above or below actual price? Dollars or cents per cwt. 
above: ___ Dollars or cents per cwt. below: 
6. In each of the following situations, indicate the maximum 
difference you would be willing to allow between price you 
get and expected price before you would consider price fore-
casts useless: 
a. Actual price falls below your forecast of price and the 
market is falling. 
1. less than 10¢ per cwt. 6. 36-40 cents 
2. 10-15 cents 7. 41-45 cents 
3. 16-25 cents 8. 46-50 cents 
4. 26-30 cents 9. More than 50¢ 
per cwt. 
s. 31-35 cents 
b. Actual price falls below your forecast of price and the 
market is rising. 
1. less than 10¢ per cwt. 6. 36-40 cents 
2. 10-15 cents 7. 41-45 cents 
3. 16-20 cents 8. 46-50 cents 
4. 21-25 cents 9. More than 50¢ 
per cwt. 
s. 26-30 cents 
VI. Mark the one statement from the following which best reflects 




---1. Cattle are sold at or near an "average" price with no real premiums for the better cattle and discounts for 
the poorer cattle. 
2. The poorer cattle are discounted but no comparable pre---- mium is paid for the better cattle. 
---3. Adequate premiums are paid for the better than average cattle and the poorer cattle are discounted an appro-
priate amount. 
4. Other; please explain. ---
If you marked 1, 2, or 4 in the previous question, please select 
from the following the ~ statement which best explains why the 
marketing system does not perform very well: 
---
---
There is not enough competition between packers to force 
them to pay a premium for the better cattle but they can 
and do discount poorer cattle. 
The packer will pay a premium for cattle which appear to 
be better than average only when he knows the feeder to 
be a "reputation feeder". 
Most feeders prefer to keep the packer guessing on how 
well the cattle will do in terms of yield, carcass cut-
ability, etc. 
Many feeders do not really know the value of their cattle 
and this prevents the well-informed feeder from getting a 
premium for his better cattle. 
Other; please explain. 
Select the pattern of performance you would prefer to see your 
operation follow: 
The business consistently yields an average yearly net 
return of 6 percent on the initial investment. Operating 
policies (including buying and selling procedures) will 
not be changed until there is indication the return will 
drop below 6 percent. Then, adjustments in operating 
procedure are made in trying to keep the return at or 
around 6 percent. 
The business returns 5-9 percent on the initial investment 
(has averaged 7 percent) but adjustments are being made 
in operating policies -- including buying and selling --
in an attempt to increase the yearly average net return 
to 8-9 percent. 
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The business earns a reasonable return on the initial 
investment, but adjustments are made in operating policies 
including buying and selling -- whenever there appears 
to be a way to increase the yearly net returns. 
The business operates under the rule that adjustments in 
operating policies -- including buying and selling -- are 
made so as to make net returns on each lot of cattle as 
large as possible. 
IX. If you knew you would be faced each year with one of the follow-
ing patterns of returns per head, which would you prefer to 
face? (The costs of getting the cattle to market weights are 
the same under all patterns.) 
Net Returns per Head from Sales 
Operations 12 Months; "Boxed" 
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X. Assume you are preparing to negotiate the sale of a load of 
choice steers. Consider the statements below and rank (1st, 
2nd, etc.) in order of importance all the factors which are 
important in determining the price you will ask for your cattle. 
---
---
Costs of gain. 
The price paid for the cattle as feeder cattle. 
Current reports of price levels in the wholesale beef 
market. 
The first bid by the buyer; if made before you mention a 
price. 
Bids already received by other potential buyers. 
Current reports of price levels in the live cattle market. 
Other; please explain. 
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XI. Please rank in order of importance (1st, 2nd, etc.) the follow-
ing factors as determinants of the value of a slaughter animal. 
Grade of the animal (quality grade). 
Dressing percentage. 
Sex of the animal. 
Age of the animal. 
Li veweigh t. 
Carcass cutability (weight of all lean cuts as percent of 
total carcass weight). 
Any other factor; please explain: 
XI I. Assume it is June 1 and you are putting feeder cattle in your 
lot. You estimate the costs of getting your steers to market 
weight in early October to be $27 .00 per cwt. (includes pur-
chase of feeders, vet expenses, feed, a lot or "yardage" cost, 
etc.). Please answer the following: 
1. Would you consider hedging the cattle? Yes --- No 
If yes, think about what the June 1 quote for the October 
futures contract would have to be for you to hedge and indi-
cate this price range: 
If no, indicate briefly why you do not consider hedging: __ 
XIII. If you knew you would be faced each year with one of the follow-
ing pattern of returns per head, which would you prefer to 
face? (The costs of getting the animals to market weight are 

















Net Returns per Head from Sales 
Operations 12 Months; "Boxed" 
Figures are Losses 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
s 1 m 3 4 10 IIf 9 







9 s IIf 11 9 rn 10 m 12 rn 3 ill 
3 5 7 0 1 5 3 8 2 6 5 3 
a 3 rn s a 9 m 10 5 11 ill 3 
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Why did you choose that particular pattern? ----------
XIV. Assume it is around June 1 and you are buying feeder cattle. 
You would expect the cattle at which you are looking to "finish" 
(grade Choice) and be ready for market in early October. Please 
answer the following: 
1. Briefly, how do you decide how much you can afford to pay 
for the feeder cattle? -------------------
2. If you decide how much you can pay with the June 1 quote for 
the October live beef futures contract at $30.00 per cwt., 
how would you change if the following had been the situa-
tion: 
a. The June 1 quote for the October futures contract was 
$28.00 instead of the $30.00 
--- would be willing to pay less f9r the feeder cattle. 
--- would be willing to pay the same for the feeder cattle. 
___ would be willing to pay more for the feeder 
cattle. 
b. The June 1 quote for the October futures contract was 
$32.00 instead of the $30.00 
--- would be willing to pay less for the feeder cattle. 
--- would be willipg to pay the same for the feeder cattle. 
___ would be willing to pay more for the feeder 
cattle. 
XV. Your cattle will be ready to sell in 6 weeks, if you were think-
ing of signing a contract today to sell the cattle to a particu-
lar packer, please answer the questions below: 
A. Choose any of the following that you would consider import-
ant and then list the numbers here in order of importance 
(for example, if #4 is most import~nt to you, list it and 
then the next important to you, list it and then the next 
most important factor, etc.). List: 
1. Specify the scales on which the cattle are to be weighe~-
2. Specify the exact time of day for weighing. 
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3. Specify when transfer of title to the cattle is to take 
place. 
4. Specify an exact pencil shrink. 
5. Guarantee a minimum dressing percentage with a specific 
schedule of price discounts for falling short of the 
guaranteed level, a schedule of premiums if the cattle 
dress higher. 
6. Guarantee a certain percentage to grade Choice with a 
specified price discount for falling short, a premium 
for exceeding the guaranteed level. 
7. Specify the basic price per cwt. you are to be paid at 
the time the contract is established. 
8. Make provisions for price to be based on the price at 
some chosen market on the day of delivery or for acer-
tain day during the week of delivery. 
B. Look at the list (1-8) again and rate them the way you think 
the packers to whom you sell would list them. (For example, 
if you feel packers would consider #2 most important, list 
it and then go to the one you feel they would rank second in 
importance etc.) List: 
C. Examine your "lists" in A and B above. If they are di£ fer-
en t, try to indicate the ~ factor you feel is most import-
ant in explaining why they are different: ________ _ 
XVI. Mark the one statement from the following which best fits your 
opinion concerning contracting. (The "contracting" to which we 
refer involves contracting to a packer after you buy the feeder 
cattle and have them on feed.) 
I am in favor of such contracts since they guarantee a 
market. 
I will contract if the packer will pay a premium above the 
"going market price" at time of delivery. [If you mark 
this alternative, please indicate the premium you feel you 
would have to receive $ ___ per cwt. (live basis)~] 
I will not contract under any conditions since this pre-
vents the packer from having to compete for cattle in the 
open market. 
I will contract at the "going market price" at the time of 
delivery since this assures the packer of steady supply of 
cattle and this leads to better working relations with the 
packer. 
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APPENDIX B 
OKLAHOMA MEAT PACKER SURVEY 
Code: ---
I. General Information. 
1. Capacity of your plant: 
Head per day __ _ 
Head per hour 
2. Plant has been in operation: Years --- Months ---
3. Do you purchase the major percentage of your slaughter 
cattle from any one particular feeder? ___ Yes No ---If yes, why? 
II. Choose ~ of the following which best describes the objectives 
or goals of your operation with respect to slaughter cattle 
procurement: 
III. 
Try to minimize the cost per head for each animal you buy 
for slaughter. 
Try to operate on a "set" margin per head which has been 
selected as adequate and buy so as to achieve this set 
margin ™ each year of operation. 
Try to buy cattle so as to realize some target average 
margin per head above the level you~~ achieving. 
Try to buy cattle so as to maximize the return or margin 
per head over each year of operation. 
If none of the above fit your case, please describe your 
objective in buying. 
1. Typical buying procedure: 
Buy at least SO percent on liveweight basis. 
Buy at least SO percent on carcass grade and weight or 
other carcass evaluation basis. 
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Buy 50-50 on liveweight and carcass basis. 
Other; please explain: 
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2. If you are buying cattle on a liveweight basis, choose one 
of the following situations which you would prefer to be in 




The feeder has given you access to his records pro-
viding detailed per head information on dressing 
percentage, carcass cut-out percentage, quality· 
grade, etc. for previous cattle he has fed. 
The feeder has given you a summary of the percent 
of his cattle which grade Choice, of average car-
cass cut-out and dressing percentage of previous 
cattle he has fed. 
The feeder makes the cattle available for your 
inspection, but offers no additional infomation. 
i. Why did you choose the particular situation 
which you marked? -------------
ii. Does your buying strategy differ depending 
upon which situation prevails -- a, b, or c 
above? ___ Yes ___ No If yes, how 
does it differ and why? ----------
iii. Assume you would be willing to pay $30 per 
cwt. (live basis) for a particular lot of 
cattle if you had seen complete information 
on previous cattle (situation a in previous 
question): What would you be likely to 
offer if instead of situation a, situation 
b prevailed? _____ per cwt., situation 
c prevailed? _____ per cwt. 
If your answer is something other than 
$30.00, why did you change? --------
iv. Which situation a, b, or c.in (ii) do you 
think the feeder would prefer? ---Why? 
v. Explain how you think the inclusion of exclu-
sion of such information operates to put 
either you or the feeders in a position of 
advantage or disadvantage as you begin 
negotiating the purchase of a lot of cattle. 
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IV. Assume you are set up to operate at 90 percent of your rated 
full capacity. Below are 5 situations which show: (1) percent-
age variations in available cattle above or below the 90. percent 
level you try to maintain and (2) a yearly average cost per year. 
Choose the one situation you would prefer to face if you knew 
you would face that situation year after year. 
Percentage Variations in the 
Available Monthly Quantity 
of Cattle Above or Below 
What You Need to Operate 
at 90% of Capacity 
Situation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Average Yearly 
Cost per cwt. 
into your Plant 
I -2 1 -1 0 -1 -1 1 2 1 -1 
II -1 2 -3 1 -1 -4 3 1 -1 -2 
III 1 -6 0 -3 5 -1 3 -5 6 -1 
IV 0 6 -5 3 -7 3 0 -6 -3 7 












Why did you mark this situation? 
V. Indicate any of the following statements which reflect your 
opinion on how the marketing system actually works: 
a. Variability in quantity of cattle available is a real 
problem. 
b. The quantity is available, but we have problems 
getting the quality we need. 
c. We find we have to pay a price above the "going market 
price" to insure a consistent number of cattle of the 
quality we need. 
d. Because of fixed costs, labor collllllitments, etc., we 
have to "bid up" prices to excessive levels during 
periods of short supply. 
e. Competition is such that during periods of short 
supply, we cannot get cattle even by bidding up prices 
since other packers do the same thing. 
f. We experience no important problems in getting a con-
s is tent number of cattle at the quality level we need. 
If one or more of (a) through (e) was selected, which is most 
important? 
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What do you feel will have to be done to solve the problem~ 
what have you done to solve the problem in your operation? 
Mark the ~ statement from the following which best reflects 
your opinion on the extent to which prices reflect the actual 
value of an animal: 
Cattle move at an "average" price with no significant pre-
mi urns for the more valuable cattle and no significant 
discounts for the less valuable cattle. 
Poorer cattle are effectively discounted, but the truly 
valuable animal does not receive the premium it deserves. 
If you marked this alternative, choose from the following 
the one ·best explanation of why such a situation prevails: 
It is difficult to merchandise the more valuable 
carcass at a higher price so we cannot pay a premium 
for the live animal. 
The packer sells in a market where specifications 
are strict but this is one-sided -- there are dis-
counts if the beef does not meet specifications but 
no premium if it exceeds specifications. 
The typical packer has to have the higher margin on 
the better carcass to offset narrow margins or losses 
on the less valuable carcasses. 
The variability in value of the beef animal is accu-
rately and adequately reflected by premiums and dis-
counts imposed by the marketing system. 
If the above are not adequate, please explain your 
opinion here. 
VI. Please rank in order of importance (1st, 2nd, etc.) the follow-
ing factors as determinants of the value of a slaughter animal: 
Grade of the animal (quality grade). 
Dressing percentage. 
Sex of the animal. 
Age of the animal. 
Liveweight. 
Carcass cutabili ty (weight of all lean cuts as percent of 
total carcass weight) 




1. Do you contract purchase any of your. slaughter cattle needs? 
Yes ___ No 
2. If yes, please answer the following: 
a. What percentage do you contract? __ _ 
b. Choose any of the following factors you consider import-
ant in the contract and list in order of importance. 
List: 
1. Specify the scales on which the cattle are to be 
weighed. 
2. Specify the exact time of day for weighing. 
3. Specify when transfer of title to the cattle is to 
take place. 
4. Specify an exact pencil shrink. 
5. Guaranteed minimum dressing percentage with a spe-
cific schedule of price discounts for falling short 
of the guaranteed level. 
6. Guaranteed set percentage to grade Choice with a 
specified price for falling short, a premium for 
exceeding the guaranteed level. 
7. Specify the basic price per cwt. you are to pay at. 
the time the contract is established. 
8. Make provisions for price to be based on the price 
at some chosen market on the day of deli very or for 
a certain day during the week of delivery. 
c. Look at the list (1-8) again and rate them the way you-
think the feeders from whom you buy would list them. 
(For example, if you feel feeders would consider 112 
most important, list it and then go to the next one you 
feel they would rank second in importance, etc.) 
List: 
d. Examine your "lists" in b & c above. If they are differ-
ent, try to indicate the ~ factor you feel is most 
important in explaining why they are different. 
Choose the ~ statement from the. following which best fits your 
opinion concerning contracting with a feeder (after the cattle 
are on feed): 
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1. I use contracts to assure a consistent availability of 
cattle for slaughter regardless of whether the market 
is going up or down. 
2 . I contract only when it appears the market will con-
tinue to rise and thus get a degree of protection 
against the price rise. 
3. I contract primarily to prevent getting forced into 
"bidding up" prices when the number of available 
cattle decreases suddenly. 
4. I do not contract to a significant extent. 
5. I contract whenever I can and then hedge my position 
in the futures market. 
6. Other; please explain: 
IX. If you do a significant amount of contracting, please select al~ 
the following which you feel indicate the effect which contract-
ing is having on the cattle market. 
1. Stabilizes the price at which cattle move by decreas-
ing short-run fluctuations in the quantity of avail-
able cattle. 
2. Stabilizes as in (1) and lowers the overall price 
level. 
3. Stabilizes ~s in (1) and raises the overall price 
level. 
4. Works to the benefit of both packer and feeder by 
establishing better working relationships. ,· 
5 . Has hurt the market in which I buy because too many 
cattle are "tied up" through contracts and I have 
trouble finding cattle. 
6. Other; please explain: 
X. A short supply of cattle can result in your "bidding up" price 
to insure your needs will be met. Conversely, price may be 
"down" when supplies are heavy. Over the year, you end up pay-
ing some "average price" for the cattle. 
1. How many weeks during a typical year do you find cattle 
supplies short enough to cause you to "bid up" price in 
trying to keep a reasonable level of slaughter? _____ _ 
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2. Would you be willing to pay feeders a premium above this 
"average" yearly price if they would guarantee you a. con_sj.$~ 
tent supply of cattle of acceptable quality all through _the_ 
XI. 1. 
year? ___ Yes ___ No If no, why not? _______ _ 
If yes, about how much would you be willing to pay to guaran-
tee yourself the following percentages of your normal kill? 
a. $ per cwt. to guarantee 20% 
b. $ per cwt. to guarantee 40% 
c. $ per cwt. to guarantee 60% 
d. $ per cwt. to guarantee 80% 
e. $ per cwt. to guarantee 100% 
Which of the combinations would you prefer if you had a 
choice? Why? 
Which do you feel the typical feeder would prefer? 
Why? 
Are feeders ready and willing to start such a program? 
Yes No Why or why not? 
In the following situation assume that you. are contra~t.ing 
in June for 1100 pounds of slaughter steers to be delivered 
in October. The contract price for the steers is $26.00 per 
cwt. You are considering hedging the cattle against 
unfavorable price fluctuations. Indicate which of the 
following October futures price quotations would cause you 
to hedge the contract. 
1. 28.00 10. 25.75 
2. 27.75 11. 25.50 
3. 27.50 12. 25.25 
4. 27.25 13. 25.00 
s. 27.00 14. 24. 75 
6. 26.75 15. 24.50 
7. 26.50 16. 24.25 




2. Do you hedge your contract purchases? ___ Yes No --If yes, why? 
If no, under what condition would you hedge? -------
XII. Assume you are set up to operate at 90 percent of your rated full 
capacity. Below are 5 situations which show: (1) percentage 
variation in available cattle above or below the 90 percent 
level you try to maintain, and (2) a yearly average cost per cwt. 







Percentage Variations in the 
Available Monthly Quantity 
of Cattle Above or Below 
What You Need to Operate 
at 90% of Capacity 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
-2 1 -1 0 -1 -1 1 2 1 -1 0 1 
-1 2 -3 1 -1 -4 3 1 -1 -2 3 1 
1 -6 0 -3 5 -1 3 -5 6 -1 1 0 
0 6 -5 3 - 7 3 0 -6 -3 7 3 5 
-3 -9 0 7 -6 6 3 -7 9 0 5 -5 
Why did you mark this situation? 
XIII. Marketing procedures: 
Average Yearly 
Cost per cwt. 







1. Do you change your buying tactics when cattle supply is 
heavy? ___ Yes ___ No If yes, in what way? 
2. Do you feel that you have market advantages over the feeder 
when the supply is heavy? ___ Yes ___ No If yes, how? 
3. Do you think the feeder changes his selling tactics when 
supply is light? ___ Yes ___ No If yes, how? 
4. Do you think the feeding indus t't'y is in such a position as 
to have market advantages over packers when supply is light? 
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